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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations about the systematic
acquisition by the National Security Agency (NSA) of telephone metadata
and internet information—and about cooperation between the NSA and its
counterpart in the United Kingdom, the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), in such acquisition—the British Foreign Secretary,
William Hague, addressed the House of Commons.1 As Foreign Secretary,
Hague was responsible for issuing warrants to GCHQ for interception of
international and wholly foreign communications. In his prepared remarks,
Hague said that:
At [the heart of the strong framework of democratic
accountability and oversight that governs the use of secret
intelligence in the United Kingdom] are two Acts of
Parliament: the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.2 The Acts
require GCHQ and other agencies to seek authorisation for
their operations from a Secretary of State, normally the Foreign
Secretary or Home Secretary. . . . This combination of needing
a warrant from one of the most senior members of the
Government, decided on the basis of detailed legal advice, and
such decisions being reviewed by independent commissioners
and implemented by agencies with strong legal and ethical
frameworks, with the addition of parliamentary scrutiny by the
[Intelligence and Security Committee]3 . . . provides one of the
strongest systems of checks and balances and democratic
accountability for secret intelligence anywhere in the world.4
In the discussion that followed, the Foreign Secretary took questions from
members of Parliament. Among the questioners was Labour MP Jack Straw,

1

William Hague, Statement to the House of Commons (June 10, 2013), 564 Parl. Deb.
H.C. (6th ser.) 31 (U.K.)
2
See infra notes 204–10, 217–32 and accompanying text.
3
The Intelligence and Security Committee was created in 1994 to enhance parliamentary
oversight of the work of the various intelligence agencies, including GCHQ. See Intelligence
Services Act, 1994, ch. 13 (Eng.).
4
William Hague, Statement to the House of Commons, supra note 1, at col. 32.
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a former Home Secretary (1997–2001), Foreign Secretary (2001–2006), and
Secretary of State for Justice (2007–2010). Straw asked Hague whether
the Secretary of State [would] accept that many of our allies,
leaving aside the United States, are astonished by the degree of
control and supervision of our system of ministerial oversight,
oversight by judicially qualified commissioners and oversight
by the [Intelligence and Security Committee], which surpasses
that of most other western democracies?5
Hague responded that “[t]he right honorable Gentleman is absolutely
right. . . . [A]s he knows very well, the system of checks and balances and
scrutiny that we have is among the strongest in the world; it could be the
strongest in the world.”6
In the United States, Snowden’s revelations were followed by, among
other things, a series of press releases by the Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper. In a statement released on June 6, 2013,
Clapper said that “[t]here is a robust legal regime in place governing all
activities conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
which ensures that those activities comply with the Constitution and laws
and appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties.”7 In a similar vein, in a
blog post on June 11, 2013, security expert and former NSA Inspector
General Joel Brenner wrote that:
The United States has the most expensive, elaborate, and multitiered intelligence oversight apparatus of any nation on Earth.
We have well staffed intelligence committees in the House and
Senate.
The National Security Division of the Justice
Department rides herd on the intelligence agencies. The FISA
Court gets detailed reports of collection under its orders. The
NSA has a robust compliance organization. It also has an
inspector general with wide powers operating outside the chain

5

Id. at col. 38.
Id.
7
Press Release, James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Statement on Recent
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.
dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2012/868-dni-statement-onrecent-unauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information?tmpl=component&format=pdf.
6
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of command. None of our European allies controls intelligence
activities with comparable rigor.8
It is understandable that officials and experts in both Britain and the
United States would be anxious to stress the superiority of their respective
systems of authorization and oversight of interception of communications.
Presumably they cannot all be right, but this does not preclude the possibility
that policy makers in both countries have established satisfactory
mechanisms for overseeing the surveillance activities of executive branch
officials, and have thereby arguably, if approximately, realized the proverbial
goal of striking a “proper balance” between liberty and security.
This Article will examine the origin and development of modern
arrangements for authorization and oversight of interception of
communications within the United Kingdom. It will then venture some
comparative conclusions. In particular, it will examine the role of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in shaping the contours of British
surveillance law and in passing judgment on the “Convention-compatibility,”
pursuant to the court’s power to enforce the human rights provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), of the surveillance regime
that Britain eventually adopted.9 In addition, the Article will compare the
surveillance regimes of Britain and the United States with reference to both
their statutory underpinnings and available statistical information about their
practical operation.

8
Joel Brenner, Power, Secrecy, and Intelligence Oversight, LAWFARE (June 11, 2013; 8:22
AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/power-secrecy-and-intelligence-oversight.
9
The European Convention is a treaty among member states of the Council of Europe
(COE). See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. It was opened for signature in Rome in 1950, and came
into force in 1953. Id. It consists today of thirteen substantive human rights guarantees
enforceable against the forty-seven current members of the COE (all of which are also state
parties to the Convention). Id.
The European Court of Human Rights began operation in 1959 and, since 1998, has been
solely responsible for enforcing the European Convention. Aisha Gani, What is the European
Convention on Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:53 PM), http://www.theguard
ian.com/law/2014/oct/03/what-is-european-convention-on-human-rights-echr. The court sits
in Strasbourg, France, and currently consists of one judge from each of the member states of
the COE. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECTHR), THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 4
(Feb. 2014), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf. The
court devolves into “Chambers” of seven judges—and in important cases into a “Grand
Chamber” of seventeen judges—for the purpose of deciding cases. Id. at 5.
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It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited scope of the ensuing
discussion. The phrase “interception of communications” has many
meanings. In particular, questions of the legality of government access to the
content of communications—the core of the present analysis—bleed
inexorably into questions regarding the legal status of non-content
“communications data,” such as phone numbers and email addresses, and of
various categories of “stored communications.”
In addition, both
governments and private-sector organizations are steadily perfecting their
ability to engage in “data mining” of the vast amounts of heretofore largely
inaccessible information that is now available in digital form. Finally, trends
in surveillance practices cannot easily be separated from overarching
concerns about the demise of privacy in modern society and the role of
technology in transforming the relationship between citizens, private-sector
institutions, and the state.10
The discussion that follows will not attempt to explore more than a small
corner of the overall problem of government surveillance and privacy rights.
Analysis will be confined to examining the real-time acquisition of the
content of telephone conversations, that is, “traditional wiretapping,” or what
today might even be called “old-fashioned wiretapping.” In addition, the
Article will focus primarily, although not exclusively, on the history and
modern content of the law of telephone wiretapping in Britain and the United
States.11

10

Discussions of the expanding scope of both governmental and non-governmental
surveillance are proliferating rapidly. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); ERIC METCALFE, JUSTICE, FREEDOM FROM
SUSPICION: SURVEILLANCE REFORM FOR A DIGITAL AGE (2011); SHANE HARRIS, THE
WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S SURVEILLANCE STATE (2010); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, SURVEILLANCE: CITIZENS AND THE STATE, REPORT, 2008–09, H.L. 18-I (U.K.);
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY?, 2007–08, H.C. 58-I (U.K.); Jack M.
Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
11
This Article will not undertake a systematic comparative analysis of wiretapping in
numerous jurisdictions. For examples of comparative studies that encompass a broader or
different spectrum of countries, see Mark H. Gitenstein, Nine Democracies and the Problems
of Detention, Surveillance, and Interrogation, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN
AGENDA FOR REFORM 7–42 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009); Paul M. Schwartz, Evaluating
Telecommunications Surveillance in Germany: The Lessons of the Max Planck Institute’s
Study, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1244 (2004) (reviewing a study of telephone wiretapping in
seventeen countries, including thirteen European countries and Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States); LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 39–126 (1994) (comparing Britain,
Canada, and Australia).
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Finally, the Article will be confined to examining “domestic” or
“internal” surveillance, as distinct from “strategic” or “external” surveillance
(often described as the collection of “signals intelligence”). “Domestic” or
“internal” surveillance is usually understood to encompass the use within
national boundaries of electronic devices and/or covert human operatives to
target individuals who are themselves located within the national boundary.
“Strategic” or “external” surveillance, on the other hand, usually refers to the
use of surveillance capabilities to monitor international or wholly external
communications. The distinction between the two forms of surveillance is
almost certainly becoming less tenable with every passing day. However,
legislative enactments and court decisions in both the United States and
Europe have for many years distinguished between surveillance that consists
of tracking individuals through deployment of domestic surveillance
capabilities—even if the individuals are non-citizens or the threats they pose
originate in foreign countries—and surveillance strategies aimed at
systematically monitoring international or wholly external communications
or targeting persons located outside of national boundaries.12 The discussion
12
The national agencies primarily responsible for the conduct of external or strategic
surveillance include America’s National Security Agency, Britain’s Government
Communications Headquarters, and Germany’s Foreign Intelligence Service
(Bundesnachrichtendienst).
The ECtHR examined and upheld the “Convention
compatibility” of German procedures for the conduct of external surveillance in Weber and
Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76586. Procedural arrangements for the conduct of external
surveillance by GCHQ were challenged in the European Court and found wanting, although
not fundamentally so, in Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87207.
More recently, in response to claims by ten human rights organizations—including
Liberty, Privacy International, and Amnesty International—the UK’s Investigatory Powers
Tribunal (IPT) issued a series of public rulings. The claimants alleged that the surveillance
activities of GCHQ, including its bulk collection of both the content and metadata of
telephone and internet communications, and its collaboration with the NSA in such collection,
were incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR and illegal under the UK’s regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000). In two initial rulings, the IPT rejected most of
the claimants’ allegations, including the core allegation that GCHQ’s bulk collection activities
were incompatible with Article 8 and illegal under RIPA 2000. See Liberty v. GCHQ, [2014]
UKIPTrib13/77-H, available at http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/IPT_13_168-173_H.pdf; Liberty
v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2015] UKIPTrib 13/77-H,
available at http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Liberty_Ors_Judgment_6Feb15.pdf. In a third
ruling, the IPT held that interception of emails of two of the ten NGOs—the Egyptian
Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) and the South African-based Legal Resources Centre
(LRC)—had been lawful under RIPA but had breached Article 8 because of GCHQ’s failure
to follow its own procedures governing the length of time during which emails were retained
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that follows will be confined, insofar as it is possible to do so, to the
former.13
The remainder of this Article will be divided into four parts. Part II will
briefly explore the transnational legal environment with which British policy
makers were confronted when they reexamined their interception practices in
the late 1970s. Most prominent in this respect were various court decisions
and legislative enactments of which the surveillance regimes of the United
States and Germany were comprised.
Part III will describe the evolution of surveillance law in the United
Kingdom between 1979 and 2000. Part III.A will examine a 1979 challenge
in the British High Court to then-existent non-statutory arrangements for
telephone wiretapping by the police. Fallout from the court’s decision
culminated six years later in Parliament’s passage of the Interception of
Communications Act 1985. Part III.B will examine Parliament’s response to
the need for additional surveillance-related reforms in the years between
1985 and 2000 and its eventual decision to consolidate statutory regulation of
a spectrum of surveillance powers in the omnibus Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Part IV will examine the ECtHR’s decision in Kennedy v. United
Kingdom (2010). The case served as a vehicle for the court’s decision
and the way in which particular emails were selected for further examination. The tribunal
informed the other eight claimants in the litigation that “no determination had been made in
[their] favour,” leaving them in doubt about whether their communications had been
intercepted in the first place. See Liberty v. GCHQ, [2015] UKIPTrib 13/77-H-2, available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2108743/final-liberty-ors-opendetermination.pdf. See also infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. On July 1, 2015, in
an exceedingly embarrassing development, the tribunal sent an email to Amnesty International
admitting that it was Amnesty rather than the Egyptian organization whose emails had been
lawfully collected but mishandled by GCHQ after their initial collection. This, of course,
constituted official proof that GCHQ had been systematically collecting Amnesty’s emails and
conceivably examining and making further use of some of them. See Owen Bowcott, GCHQ
spied on Amnesty International, tribunal tells group in email, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2015),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/01/gchq-spied-amnesty-internatio
nal-tribunal-email. In the meantime, on April 10, 2015, all ten organizations submitted an
application to the ECtHR challenging the IPT’s initial rulings upholding the legality and
Convention-compatibility of GCHQ’s bulk collection activities. See The European Court of
Human Rights Application: 10 Human Rights Organisations v United Kingdom, Additional
Submissions on the Facts and Complaints, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.amne
sty.org/en/documents/ior60/1415/2015/en/.
13
Edward Snowden’s revelations have primarily focused on the conduct of external
surveillance and the bulk collection of telephone and internet metadata by the NSA, GCHQ,
and other intelligence agencies. The ensuing analysis will therefore not address them in any
detail.

2016] JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNICATIONS 245
upholding the Convention-compatibility of the interception regime initially
placed on a statutory footing by Parliament in the Interception of
Communications Act 1985 and re-enacted, with minor modifications, in the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Finally, Part V will compare the British and American approaches to
authorization and oversight of interception of communications. By now, the
British system of executive warrants is well established, and has received the
imprimatur of the ECtHR. It does not exist in a vacuum, however, but
operates in conjunction with a set of quasi-judicial mechanisms for
overseeing executive branch surveillance activities. In the United States,
ordinary courts and the FISA Court continue to be solely responsible for preapproving executive branch surveillance and for reviewing the lawfulness of
such surveillance when it is challenged. Which system does a better job of
enabling government to combat crime and protect national security, while
simultaneously constraining abuses of executive power and safeguarding
citizens’ rights, remains a surprisingly open question.
II. CONSTRUCTING AN INTERCEPTION REGIME IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT
The British were forced by circumstances to reexamine their approach to
interception of communications in the late 1970s.14 At that time, awareness
of foreign judicial precedent was growing among human rights activists in
many jurisdictions, including Britain. In addition, the decision-making
institutions of the Council of Europe, including the ECtHR, were becoming
more assertive. The upshot was that British judges and other policy makers
were obliged to respond to transnational developments in surveillance law
and privacy rights that in earlier decades might have been dismissed as
irrelevant. The two most prominent bodies of non-British law were the
constitutional rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court and the emerging
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.

14

See infra Part III.
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A. The Fourth Amendment and Wiretapping in the United States
1. Katz v. United States
In 1967, in Katz v. United States,15 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
wiretapping and third party bugging by law enforcement officials requires a
judicial warrant based on probable cause. Katz brought to a close a period of
nearly forty years during which wiretapping had not been subject to Fourth
Amendment restraint. In the Court’s initial encounter with wiretapping,
Olmstead v. United States,16 Chief Justice Taft, writing for a five-to-four
majority, noted that “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants,”17 nor any seizure of “tangible material effects.”18 As a result, he
concluded, “the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”19 Some four decades
later—in Katz, a case involving a variation on the technique of third party
bugging20—the Court concluded that the government’s activities “violated
the privacy upon which [the petitioner] justifiably relied . . . and thus
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”21 The Court then held that “the usual requirement of advance
authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause” would
henceforth be “a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic
surveillance involved in this case.”22
2. Title III (1968)
Seven months after the Katz decision, Congress enacted the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III of which remains the
principal federal legislation regulating interception of communications in

15

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17
Id. at 464.
18
Id. at 466.
19
Id.
20
Law enforcement agents had overheard one end of a telephone conversation by attaching
a device to the outside of a public telephone booth. Id. at 348.
21
Id. at 353.
22
Id. at 358–59.
16

2016] JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNICATIONS 247
ordinary criminal cases.23 As amended by the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, Title III makes it a crime for “any person [to]
intentionally intercept . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”24
However, the Attorney General or other specially designated high-level
Department of Justice officials “may authorize an application to a Federal
judge of competent jurisdiction for . . . an order authorizing or approving the
interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [or other federal agency] when such interception may provide
[evidence of the commission of various specified federal offenses].”25 The
judge to whom an application is made is authorized to enter an ex parte order
approving interception if he or she determines that “there is probable cause
for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit a [specified] offense.”26
Title III contains a mandatory—and rather generous—post-surveillance
notification provision. Under section 2518(8)(d),
[w]ithin a reasonable time but not later than ninety days . . . the
issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served, on the
persons named in the order or the application, and such other
parties to intercepted communications as the judge may
determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an
inventory which shall include notice of . . . the fact of the entry
of the order or the application [and the fact that]
communications were or were not intercepted.27
The judge may also “in his discretion make available to such person or his
counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communications,
applications and orders as the judge determines to be in the interest of
justice.”28
23

Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211–25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2522 (2012), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)). For further in depth discussion, see Patricia
L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375 (2004).
24
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
25
Id. § 2516(1).
26
Id. § 2518(3)(a).
27
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d)(1), (3).
28
Id. § 2518(8)(d). For further discussion of the post-surveillance notification requirements
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, see infra notes 48–54 and accompanying
text. For discussion of the post-surveillance notification requirements of German and British
interception law, see infra notes 61–80, 169–85, 252–70 and accompanying text.
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Title III contains a statutory exclusionary rule and numerous other
safeguards against executive branch abuse of the power to wiretap in
criminal cases. The safeguards are so numerous, in fact, that congressional
regulation of such surveillance has been described as imposing “a superwarrant requirement for telephones,”29 and the Department of Justice itself
readily admits that “several of Title III’s provisions are more restrictive than
what is required by the Fourth Amendment.”30
The Supreme Court’s decision in Katz and Congress’s passage of Title III
fundamentally revamped the law of electronic surveillance in the United
States. In particular, they firmly established the necessity of judicial preapproval of executive branch use of electronic surveillance in ordinary
criminal investigations. What neither Katz nor Title III resolved, however,
was the question of executive branch power to wiretap or engage in other
forms of covert surveillance to protect against alleged threats to national
security.
3. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith)
The Supreme Court addressed the existence and scope of a national
security exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in United
States v. U.S. District Court (Keith).31 Keith involved an alleged plot by
domestic radicals to bomb a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.32 The
Nixon Administration argued that the government was exempt from the need
to obtain a judicial warrant whenever it believed it was dealing not with
ordinary criminal activity but instead with a domestic threat to national
security.33 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, diplomatically but firmly
rejected the government’s position. He acknowledged the government’s
concerns—that the collection of intelligence is different from the gathering
of evidence,34 that courts would be ill-equipped to make probable cause
determinations in national security cases,35 and that the need to request
judicial approval would jeopardize the secrecy of intelligence-gathering
29

Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 630 (2003).
30
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 9, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, SECTION 9-7.100,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm.
31
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
32
Id. at 299.
33
Id. at 303–04.
34
Id. at 318–19.
35
Id. at 319.
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operations36—but concluded that such concerns “do not justify departure in
this case from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial
approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance.”37
Justice Powell ended his opinion by noting that the Court’s decision was
confined to “the domestic aspects of national security” and did not purport to
address “the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of
foreign powers or their agents.”38 He also noted that even though the Court
was holding “that prior judicial approval is required for the type of domestic
security surveillance involved in this case,”39 Congress might decide that
“the application and affidavit showing probable cause [in domestic security
cases] need not follow the exact requirements of [Title III]” and also that
“the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to
any member of a specially designated court.”40
Justice Powell thus extended an invitation to Congress to implement the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment in domestic security
cases by enacting legislation that required prior judicial approval of
electronic surveillance but exempted executive officials from the rigorous
demands of Title III. Congress did not immediately respond. When it did,
however, it produced legislation that closely tracked Powell’s suggestions.
What Congress also did, however, was to implement those suggestions in
legislation aimed at regulating executive branch use of electronic
surveillance in foreign security cases—that is, addressing the constitutional
issue upon which the Court had expressly refrained from passing judgment.
4. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197841
In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Congress
created a seven-judge special court, known as the “FISA Court” or the
“FISC,” which was given jurisdiction to “hear applications for and grant
orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States
under the procedures [established by FISA].”42 Orders may be sought from
36

Id.
Id. at 321.
38
Id. at 321–22.
39
Id. at 324.
40
Id. at 323.
41
Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1885c (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
42
50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1). The FISA Court was subsequently enlarged from seven to
eleven judges by section 208 of the USA PATRIOT Act. See Uniting and Strengthening
37
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the court when the target of proposed surveillance is either a “foreign power”
or “an agent of a foreign power,”43 and “a significant purpose of the
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.”44 The judge to
whom an application is made is authorized to issue an order if he or she finds
that “there is probable cause to believe that [the] target of the electronic
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”45
Applications to the FISA Court ordinarily originate with the FBI, but are
reviewed by Department of Justice lawyers before presentation to the
Attorney General for his or her approval.46 Since 2006, responsibility for
preparing and filing applications for FISA Court orders has been assigned to
the National Security Division of the Justice Department.47
In contrast to Title III, FISA contains nothing resembling a “mandatory”
or “generous” mechanism for post-surveillance notification of targeted
persons. Under FISA, the target of electronic surveillance does not become
an “aggrieved person” entitled to notification unless the government intends
to enter into evidence any information obtained or derived from the
surveillance “in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding.”48 In addition,
whenever an aggrieved person files a motion “to discover or obtain
applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance”—
as a prelude, presumably, to filing a motion to suppress FISA-derived
evidence—the Attorney General is authorized to file an affidavit under oath
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter the USA
PATRIOT Act].
43
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A).
44
Id. § 1804(a)(6)(B).
45
Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A). For detailed discussions of FISA, see Americo R. Cinquegrana, The
Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1989); Patricia L. Bellia, The
‘Lone Wolf’ Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 425 (2005); ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT
WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT (2015), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/analysis/What_Went_%20Wrong_With_The_FISA_Court.pdf.
46
National Security Division Sections and Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/nsd/sections-offices.
47
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 106(b), 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)). See also David
S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 4–8
(2011).
48
50 U.S.C. § 1806(c). Under the statute, an “aggrieved person” is defined as “a person
who is the target of an electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or
activities were subject to electronic surveillance.” Id. § 1801(k).
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with the court “that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the
national security of the United States.”49 The court is instructed to respond
by “review[ing] in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other
materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine
whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and
conducted.”50 In making this determination, the court is authorized to
disclose to the aggrieved person “portions” of the relevant materials, but
“only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination
of the legality of the surveillance.”51
Since FISA’s passage in 1979, it has been exceedingly rare for FISAbased surveillance to culminate in a criminal prosecution or other judicial
proceeding. As a result, persons targeted for such surveillance are unlikely
to be aware of that fact. In addition, given the phrasing of section 1806(f),
criminal defendants who do seek disclosure of FISA-derived evidence are
unlikely to succeed. Prior to 2014, no judge had ever ordered the
government to disclose to a defendant the materials on which the FISA
Court’s warrant or warrants had been based.52 In 2014, a district judge
ordered disclosure for the first time,53 but the decision was emphatically
reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.54
Although the interception regime established by FISA does require prior
judicial approval of wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, it
otherwise is not notably transparent. In the United States, targets of FISA
49

Id. § 1806(f).
Id.
51
Id.
52
Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 341 (2011) (noting
that “more that 28,000 FISA applications and renewals [have been] granted since 1979,” that
“challenges to introduction of FISA-derived evidence or demands for disclosure of [such]
evidence have been raised in approximately thirty-five cases,” and that “none of these
challenges has been successful”).
53
United States v. Daoud, No. 12CR723, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10716 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29,
2014).
54
United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir.), supplemented, 761 F.3d 678 (7th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1456 (2015). The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district
judge failed to fulfil “her obligation to evaluate the parties’ allegations in light of the FISA
materials to determine whether she could assess the legality of those materials herself, without
disclosure of them to [the defendant’s] lawyers.” 755 F.3d at 483. The court then held that
disclosure of the classified materials was not necessary and that the government’s
investigation “did not violate FISA.” Id. at 485. On July 14, 2014, the Seventh Circuit issued
a heavily redacted classified opinion explaining its conclusions, see id. 761 F.3d 678, and on
February 23, 2015, the Supreme Court, without opinion, denied the defendant’s petition for a
writ of certiorari. See id. 135 S. Ct. 1456.
50
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surveillance are not notified of that fact unless the government intends to
initiate some form of judicial proceeding, and no defendant who has tried to
gain access to FISA-derived evidence has ever succeeded in doing so. This
fact should be kept in mind in evaluating the British approach to interception
of communications, which strikes many observers as being exceptionally
secretive. Putting to one side the relative merits of a dispersed system of
judicial warrants versus a centralized system of executive warrants, it is clear
that overwhelming secrecy surrounds both the British and the American
approaches to authorization and oversight of domestic surveillance of targets
perceived to constitute a national security threat.55
5. Conclusion
By 1978, the necessity of judicial oversight of the executive branch’s use
of electronic surveillance was firmly established in American law. In the late
1960s, both Katz and Title III made plain that wiretapping in ordinary
criminal cases was subject to judicial oversight. In 1972, Keith extended the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to executive branch wiretapping
in cases involving an alleged domestic threat to national security, holding
that such surveillance “requires an appropriate prior warrant procedure.”56
Six years later, in FISA, Congress translated the Supreme Court’s insistence
on “an appropriate prior warrant procedure” into legislation that addressed
foreign threats to national security within the United States by requiring the
government to obtain judicial pre-approval for wiretapping of any person
suspected of being “an agent of a foreign power.”57 In so doing, Congress
put in place the final components of a national policy in which internal or
domestic use of wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, in
both criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering operations, is
governed by the Fourth Amendment, and the commencement of surveillance
by executive branch officials in individual cases is contingent upon the
acquisition of a judicial warrant.

55
The secrecy surrounding the warrant-granting process in the United Kingdom is
discussed in infra notes 114, 169–85, 252–70 and accompanying text.
56
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. at 320.
57
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A).
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B. The European Convention and Wiretapping: Klass v. Germany
Presumably by sheer coincidence, the year in which the U.S. Congress
passed FISA was also the year in which the issue of executive branch
wiretapping became the focus, for the first time, of European-level human
rights scrutiny. The vehicle, Klass v. Germany, involved a challenge to
German surveillance legislation alleged to violate Article 8 of the ECHR,
and it resulted in the ECtHR’s first-ever decision on the interplay between
internal surveillance regimes and fundamental human rights law.58
1. National Security and the Interception Power in Germany
In 1968, the German Parliament enacted national legislation to govern the
use of telephone wiretapping by both the police in criminal investigations
and intelligence-gathering officials in national security investigations.59 The
legislation, known as the “G10 statute,” established a bifurcated system.
Whereas wiretapping by the police required judicial pre-approval,
wiretapping by intelligence-gathering officials was governed by separate
provisions designed to enable the government to respond to perceived threats
with greater speed and secrecy.60

58

Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57510.
59
Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Restrictions on
the Secrecy of the Mail, Post, and Telecommunications], Artikel 10-Gesetz [G-10] [G-10
Statute], Aug. 13, 1968, Bundesgesetzblatt I [BGBI. I] at 949 (Ger.). The Act consisted of a
series of antiterrorism measures enacted in response to an upsurge of terrorist activities
occurring at the time. See James G. Carr, Wiretapping in West Germany, 29 AM. J. COMP. L.
607 (1981); Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032,
1054 (1983).
60
Article II of the statute dealt with wiretapping for law enforcement purposes and is
incorporated as sections 100a-101 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure Code
(Strafprozessordnug). See Carr, supra note 59, at 607 n.2; Paul M. Schwartz, German and
U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement
Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 791–94 (2003). Article I of the statute authorized the use
of wiretapping for intelligence and national security purposes. The common reference to the
law as the “G10 statute”—or simply as the “G10”—was based on the fact that passage of the
law was immediately preceded by the passage by Parliament of amendments to Article 10 of
the Constitution of the Federal Republic (the Grundgesetz or “Basic Law”). The dual purpose
of the amendments was to exempt the government from the need to get a judicial warrant in
national security cases and to confer prospective constitutional legitimacy on the G10. Klass,
App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 15-25.
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The G10 authorized procedures for wiretapping in national security cases
that differed in two principal ways from the rules that governed police
wiretapping. First, whereas post-surveillance notification was the norm in
criminal cases, the statute prohibited notifying anyone who had been targeted
for national security surveillance.61 Second, the statute created a mechanism
for intelligence-gathering officials to initiate surveillance without receiving a
judge’s pre-approval. At the federal level, the statute provided that requests
for permission to wiretap could originate with various agencies responsible
for counterintelligence and military defense. Two executive officials, the
Minister of the Interior (in the case of domestic or internal surveillance) and
the Minister of Defense (in the case of strategic or external surveillance),
were authorized to issue warrants and were required to do so personally.62
Two bodies were responsible for overseeing the ministers’ decisions to
issue warrants. The first was a five-person board consisting of members of
Parliament representing a cross-section of political parties, including the
opposition, which was responsible for reviewing a semi-annual report
prepared by each of the ministers (G10 Board).63 An additional and more
important responsibility of the G10 Board was to appoint a three-person
“G10 Commission.”64 Under the law as written, each minister was “bound
every month to provide . . . an account [to the Commission] of the measures
he has ordered.”65 In addition, the Commission was authorized to review
wiretap orders and to entertain applications from persons who believed
themselves to be under surveillance. The Commission could require
immediate termination of any interception order which it deemed “illegal or
unnecessary.”66
The G10 statute was challenged by a group of public officials and lawyers
who alleged that it violated Article 8 of the European Convention.67 Article
8 consists of two paragraphs. The first paragraph guarantees that
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
61

Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10.
Id. para. 18.
63
Id. para. 21. See also Daniel Saperstein, Note, The European Counterterrorist As the
Next U.S. Cold Warrior: Why the United States Should Select from the German and British
Models of Procedure, Evidence, and Oversight for National Security Wiretapping, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1947, 1977 (2009).
64
Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 19.
65
Id. para. 21. The chairman of the G10 Commission was required to be someone
“qualified to hold judicial office.” Id.
66
Id. para. 21.
67
Id. para. 10.
62
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and his correspondence.”68 The second paragraph qualifies this right by
stipulating that “[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests [inter alia] of national
security . . . [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime . . . .”69
The plaintiffs in Klass argued that the G10 statute violated Article 8 for
two reasons: first, they objected to the fact that in national security cases, the
G10 eliminated judicial pre-approval of wiretapping and substituted a system
of executive or ministerial warrants.70 Second, they contended that the law
violated Article 8 because it permitted the government to conduct covert
surveillance of persons deemed to constitute a threat to national security
“without obliging the authorities in every case to notify the persons
concerned after the event.”71
2. The Road to Strasbourg: Intervening Developments
The Klass case reached the ECtHR in 1978. Prior to reaching the court,
however, two important developments occurred. First, the German Federal
Constitutional Court examined the validity of the G10 statute under the
German Constitution and reached two main conclusions.72 First, the German
court upheld the constitutional validity of executive or ministerial warrants in
conjunction with ex post review of the lawfulness of ministers’ decisions by
the G10 Commission.73 Second, however, the court stopped short of
endorsing the constitutional validity of the G10 as a whole. The court

68

ECHR, supra note 9, art. 8(1).
Id. art. 8(2).
70
Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10.
71
Id. The plaintiffs in Klass were not required to allege that they had in fact been
wiretapped because, by American standards, standing requirements in Article 8 cases
involving covert surveillance are effectively eliminated. The ECtHR decided the standing
issue by “accept[ing] that an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be the victim
of a violation [of his or her Article 8 rights] occasioned by the mere existence . . . of
legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in
fact applied to him.” Id. para. 34 (emphasis in original).
72
Bundesgerichtschof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 15, 1970,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 30 (1), 1970 (Ger.). The case is known in translation as
the “Monitoring Opinion” or the “Privacy of Communications Case.” See Schwartz, supra
note 60, at 773–77.
73
The court concluded that the Commission “provid[ed] as effective [control] of the
surveillance as the judiciary provided for wiretaps sought under the authority of the criminal
law.” Schwartz, supra note 60, at 775 (citing 30 BVerfGE, 1 (23) (Ger.)).
69
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concluded that section 5(5) of the law, which mandated a blanket ban on
post-surveillance notification of targeted persons, was incompatible with the
German Constitution because it prohibited “informing the affected party
about the restrictive measures [even] when it can occur without endangering
the goal of the restriction.”74
The second development that antedated the ECtHR’s decision in Klass
was a substantial expansion of the de facto role of the G10 Commission. In
the G10 statute as written, the Commission was confined to conducting a
once-a-month ex post review of ministers’ wiretap orders.75 After 1970,
however, “apparently responsive to political considerations, [federal Interior
Ministers adopted] a policy of presenting applications [for surveillance
orders] to the G-10 Commission for prior review and approval.”76
The G10 statute as written also prescribed that none of the targets of
national security surveillance was entitled to post-surveillance notification.77
The German Constitutional Court in its 1970 “Monitoring Opinion” had
decided that post-surveillance notification was sometimes required, but it had
not delineated “when notice would be required, or who (i.e., the G-10
Commission or the Interior Minister) was to decide whether notice was to be
provided.”78 In the wake of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision,
however, ministers began the practice of submitting to the G10 Commission
their decisions to withhold notification, and the Commission assumed de
facto power to “direct the Minister to inform the person concerned that he
has been subjected to surveillance measures.”79 Therefore by 1978, the
ECtHR was not only conscious of the greatly expanded role of the G10
Commission, but was also aware that the German government intended to
formalize the Commission’s role in proposed amendments to the G10
statute.80
In sum, between 1968 and 1978 two main events occurred. First, the
Federal Constitutional Court issued its 1970 decision requiring postsurveillance notification of some but not all targets of national security

74

Id. at 776 (quoting BVerfGE, 30 (32) (Ger.)). See also Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28
Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 11.
75
Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 21.
76
Carr, supra note 59, at 622.
77
Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10.
78
Carr, supra note 59, at 613.
79
Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 19.
80
Id. para. 21. The amendments were enacted on September 13, 1978, one week after the
Klass decision was handed down. Carr, supra note 59, at 613 n.50.
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surveillance.81 Second, the G10 Commission assumed de facto power both
to pre-approve ministers’ decisions to initiate surveillance and to withhold
post-surveillance notification.82 These developments presumably made the
ECtHR’s task of deciding whether the G10 statute was compatible with
Article 8 of the ECHR considerably easier than it might otherwise have been.
3. Klass v. Germany
The ECtHR began its assessment by asserting—in a passage that is
reiterated without fail in all of its post-Klass surveillance decisions—that the
court “must be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted,
there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”83 It then noted
that in the area of executive branch electronic surveillance, “it is in principle
desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge.”84 However, the court
concluded that the G10 Board and the G10 Commission “are independent of
the authorities carrying out the surveillance, and are vested with sufficient
powers and competence to exercise an effective and continuous control.”85 It
followed, in the court’s view, that “the exclusion of judicial control does not
exceed the limits of what may be deemed necessary in a democratic
society.”86
On the post-surveillance notification issue, the ECtHR expressed
skepticism that it was “feasible in practice to require subsequent notification
in all cases.”87 It chose instead to endorse the compromise adopted by the
Federal Constitutional Court, that is, to require post-surveillance notification
“as soon as notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of the
restriction.”88 The ECtHR then reached its final conclusion that “the German
legislature was justified to consider the interference resulting from [the G10
statute] with the exercise of the right guaranteed by Article 8(1) as being
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and for
the prevention of disorder or crime (Art. 8(2)).”89
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See supra notes 74, 77–79 and accompanying text.
Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 19, 21
Id. para. 50.
Id. para. 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 58.
Id.
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4. Conclusion
Klass achieved a variety of objectives. First, the decision signaled that
written legislation authorizing and regulating the exercise of interception of
communications by executive branch officials was desirable, and perhaps
even imperative. Second, it adopted a generous approach to standing,
whereby an individual could challenge existing surveillance legislation
“without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him.”90
Third, it held that in the context of intelligence gathering and the protection
of national security, mechanisms for overseeing executive branch electronic
surveillance other than pre-approval by courts were permissible, provided
they incorporated “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”91
Finally, Klass suggested that in national security cases, a blanket
prohibition on notification of targeted persons would violate the ECHR.
However, by the time the case reached the ECtHR, the G10’s blanket
prohibition had been preemptively excised from the law by the Federal
Constitutional Court, which required selective post-surveillance notification
as a matter of domestic German constitutional law.92 Thus, it cannot be said
that Klass precluded the possibility that a blanket ban on post-surveillance
notification in national security cases would be consistent with the ECHR.
In addition, Klass necessarily failed to address the role of Article 8 in
placing constraints on the power of government to engage in interception of
communications in ordinary criminal cases. In particular, the decision left
open two questions. The first was whether a system that excluded courts
from playing any role in pre-approving law enforcement officials’
interception decisions would violate the ECHR. The second was whether, in
ordinary criminal cases, the ECHR would permit a selective ban, let alone a
blanket ban, on post-surveillance notification of targeted persons. A brewing
challenge to British arrangements for interception of communications by
executive branch officials in both national security investigations and
ordinary criminal cases provided a vehicle for the ECtHR to scrutinize these
important issues.

90
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Id. para. 34; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 50.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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III. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The interplay of judicial and legislative decisions that led eventually to
the ECtHR’s 2010 opinion in Kennedy v. United Kingdom took three full
decades to unfold. From 1979–1985, an initial round of developments
occurred that focused on the issue of telephone tapping in criminal cases.
This culminated in the passage of the Interception of Communications Act
1985. In the ensuing fifteen years, British policy makers struggled to
respond to the ECtHR’s insistence on greater statutory regulation of the
security services and of forms of covert surveillance other than wiretapping.
In 2000, Parliament brought some closure to the events of this period by
enacting the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.
A. Initial Developments, 1979–1985
The Klass decision was handed down on September 6, 1978. Only a few
weeks earlier, an antiques dealer named James Malone had been on trial in
London for the offense of handling stolen property.93 During the trial, it was
revealed that Malone’s telephone had been tapped and that the police had
intercepted at least one conversation.94 The trial ended partially in acquittal
and partially in a mistrial, whereupon Malone instituted civil proceedings
against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner in the Chancery Division of
the High Court.95 The relief he sought was a declaration that the Police
Commissioner had acted unlawfully by tapping Malone’s telephone, even
though all parties to the litigation conceded that the tapping had been done
pursuant to a warrant issued by the Home Secretary.96 Malone’s civil suit
culminated, within Britain, with the issuance of a judgment by ViceChancellor Robert Megarry, Chief Judge of the Chancery Division of the
High Court.97
The Malone litigation brought to light a substantial array of obscure
details about the practice of wiretapping in Britain. The information had
been published in a 1957 report of the Committee of Privy Councillors
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Simon Chesterman, “Ordinary Citizens” or A License to Kill? The Turn to Law in
Regulating Britain’s Intelligence Services, 29 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 2 (2011).
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For further discussion of the background of the Malone case and the decision of the High
Court, see infra in notes 118–41 and accompanying text.
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(Birkett Report).98 The Birkett Report may have been widely read at the time
it was issued, but by the late 1970s its notoriety had faded. As a result, when
its contents were disseminated anew in connection with the Malone decision,
they came as a revelation to many.
1. The Birkett Report (1957)
The mandate of the Birkett Committee was to “report upon the exercise
by the Secretary of State of the executive power to intercept
communications.”99 In 1957, the post office was responsible for operating
both the postal system and the telephone system.100 Thus, the Birkett
Committee was charged with examining the role of the executive, in
conjunction with the post office, in the interception of both postal and
telephone communications.101
With respect to the interception of postal communications, the Committee
reported that statutes in force since 1710 forbid postal employees from
opening mail except when authorized to do so “in obedience to an express
warrant in writing under the hand of a Secretary of State.”102 With respect to
telephone communications, the Committee discovered that the post office
was likewise responsible for responding to government requests to engage in
wiretapping—from both the police and the Security Service (MI5)—and that
it had been doing so “from time to time since the introduction of the
telephone.”103
There was one important difference, however, between the power of the
post office to open mail, on the one hand, and to tap telephones, on the other:
the power to tap telephones had no statutory foundation.104 No provision of
the Post Office Act 1953 or of any other parliamentary legislation expressly
authorized the government to engage in telephone tapping, with or without a

98

COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS, INQUIRY INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS,
BIRKETT REPORT, 1957, Cmnd. 283 (U.K.) [hereinafter BIRKETT REPORT], available at http://
www.fipr.org/rip/Birkett.htm. The Committee was chaired by Lord Norman Birkett and thus
bears his name.
99
Id. ¶ 1.
100
Id. ¶ 40.
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Id. ¶ 39.
102
Id. ¶ 33 (quoting Post Office Act 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. II, c. 36, §58(1) (U.K.), at the time the
most recent version of the statute of 1710).
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Id. ¶ 40.
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Id. ¶ 27.
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warrant issued by the Secretary of State.105 Consequently, the Committee
reported that until 1937 “[n]o warrants by the Secretary of State were
therefore issued.”106
The Birkett Committee also learned, however, that in 1937 the
government had decided that interception of telephone communications, like
interception of postal communications, should be conditioned on a warrant
issued by the Secretary of State for the Home Department.107 The decision
extended the system of “executive” or “ministerial” warrants—that is, those
issued by the Home Secretary, rather than a judge—to cover telephone
tapping as well as the opening of mail.108 The extension was effected not by
the passage of legislation, however, but by administrative fiat. Thus, the
interception of telephone communications continued to lack any express
statutory foundation.109
The Birkett Committee then turned to the actual practice of wiretapping
by government officials. It determined that the Home Secretary relied on
established but unpublished criteria when deciding whether to issue a
warrant.110 Three criteria governed the issuance of warrants to investigate
ordinary criminal activity:
(a) The offence must be really serious.111
(b) Normal methods of investigation must have been tried and
failed [or] be unlikely to succeed if tried.
(c) There must be good reason to think that an interception
would result in a conviction.112
The Birkett Committee also examined the government’s use of telephone
tapping to protect against threats to national security. The Committee
determined that the Security Service (MI5) was responsible for wiretapping
in such cases, and that it did so pursuant to a warrant issued by the Home
Secretary. The Committee also learned that the criterion on which the
105
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Secretary of State based decisions to issue a warrant was that “[t]here must
be a major subversive or espionage activity that is likely to injure the
national interest.”113
A final important finding of the Birkett Committee concerned the use to
which the evidence produced by a wiretap was put. The Committee reported
that it was the unvarying practice of the Home Office not only to refrain
from notifying persons who had been the targets of a wiretap, even in
criminal cases, but also to scrupulously avoid using wiretap evidence in
criminal prosecutions, and to respond to all inquiries by refusing to confirm
or deny that telephone tapping had occurred at all.114
The Birkett Committee then offered two broad conclusions. First, it
noted that it has “been urged in some quarters that the authority for the issue
of warrants for interception should not be left exclusively in the hands of the
Secretary of State” and that the “chief suggested alternatives . . . are that the
Home Secretary should be assisted by an Advisory Committee or that
warrants should be issued only on a sworn information before magistrates or
a High Court judge.”115 The Committee responded that in its opinion,
neither of these proposals would improve matters. If a number
of magistrates or judges had the power to issue such warrants,
the control of the use to which methods of interception can be
put would be weaker than under the present system. It might
well prove easier in practice to obtain warrants.116
The Committee’s second and overall conclusion was that it was
satisfied that all the officers and officials concerned are
scrupulous and conscientious in the use and exercise of the
power to intercept communications. We are satisfied that
interception is highly selective and that it is used only where
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Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 152. The Home Office policy of never relying on wiretap evidence in individual
cases has often been questioned but has never been abandoned. The most recent reaffirmation
of the policy is the report of a cross-party group of Privy Counselors chaired by Sir John
Chilcot. See SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, INTERCEPT AS EVIDENCE, 2014, Cm. 8989
(U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/388111/InterceptAsEvidence.pdf; see also infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
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Id. ¶ 86.
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there is good reason to believe that a serious offence or security
interest is involved.117
2. Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
The 1957 Birkett Report continued to accurately describe the practice of
telephone tapping in Britain in 1979, when the High Court decided James
Malone’s civil suit against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner.118 The
litigation arose when, in the course of Malone’s 1978 criminal prosecution
for handling stolen property, a police sergeant inadvertently provided the
court with notes of a 1977 telephone conversation between Malone and
another.119 In doing so, of course, the sergeant had breached the longstanding policy of the Home Office against courtroom disclosure of intercept
evidence.120 However, his misstep obliged the government to admit that in
accordance with policy—that is, on the authority of a warrant signed by the
Secretary of State—an interception had occurred.121 The trial ended
inconclusively, and while awaiting re-trial, Malone filed his suit in the High
Court.122
The lawsuit consisted of three main claims. First, Malone argued that
there was at common law a “right of privacy” that made it “unlawful for
anyone,” including the post office on the authority of a warrant issued by the
Secretary of State, “to intercept or monitor the telephone conversations of
another without the consent of that other.”123 Second, Malone argued that
telephone tapping as practiced in the United Kingdom violated Article 8 of
the ECHR “as construed by the European Court [in the Klass case].”124
Finally, Malone argued that telephone tapping as practiced in the United
Kingdom was unlawful because it was not based on “any grant of powers to
the executive to tap telephones, either by statute or by the common law.”125
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119
120
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Id. ¶ 123.
Malone, 2 All E. R. 620; see also supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
Malone, 2 All E. R. at 624.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
Malone, 2 All E. R. at 624.
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
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3. The Decision in Malone
In the end, Vice-Chancellor Megarry dismissed all of Malone’s claims.
In the course of a long and thoughtful judgment, however, he conscientiously
addressed each of the plaintiff’s arguments. Malone’s first claim was that
while the English common law might not recognize a general right of
privacy, it did at least recognize “a particular right of privacy . . . to hold a
telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home without molestation.”126
To support this claim, Malone relied on the famous English general warrant
cases, including Entick v. Carrington, and on the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
In Entick v. Carrington,127 Lord Camden had examined the legality of a
search of Entick’s home for seditious literature under a general warrant
issued by the Secretary of State, Lord Halifax.128 Camden concluded that in
the absence of a clear common law or statutory basis for the exercise by the
Secretary of State of the power to issue the warrant, the resulting search was
an illegal trespass.129 Vice-Chancellor Megarry concluded, however, that
Malone could not obtain “any assistance . . . from the general warrant
cases.”130 Despite conceding that “there is admittedly no statute which in
terms authorises the tapping of telephones, with or without a warrant,”
Megarry found that
any conclusion that the tapping of telephones is therefore
illegal would plainly be superficial in the extreme. The reason
why a search of premises which is not authorised by law is
illegal is that it involves the tort of trespass to those premises:
and any trespass, whether to land or goods or the person, that is
made without legal authority is prima facie illegal. Telephone
tapping by the Post Office, on the other hand, involves no act
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Id. at 631.
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 807.
128
Nathan Carrington was the most senior of the “King’s Messengers,” four of whom had
conducted the search of Entick’s premises and been sued for trespass in the Court of Common
Pleas. Id. at 807–08.
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Id. at 818.
130
Malone, 2 All E. R. at 640.
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of trespass. . . . [A]ll that is done is done within the Post
Office’s own domain.131
Vice-Chancellor Megarry was also unwilling to accept Malone’s
Fourth Amendment-based argument in support of the existence of an
English common law right of telephone privacy. He acknowledged that
the Fourth Amendment was “mainly based on the English cases on
general warrants, especially Entick v. Carrington.”132 He also recognized
that in Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court had “rejected
previous authority which held that the Fourth Amendment was not
violated by telephone tapping which was effected without any act of
trespass or any seizure of any material object.”133 Nevertheless, he
insisted that “[t]hough mainly based on the English cases on general
warrants, the Fourth Amendment goes far beyond anything to be found in
those cases; and Katz is explicitly based on the Fourth Amendment.”134
He concluded, therefore, that he did not think that “either the Fourth
Amendment or the [Katz] decision gives any real assistance to counsel’s
contentions for the plaintiff about the law of England.”135
Megarry was also unconvinced by Malone’s argument that Article 8 of
the ECHR conferred “direct rights” on U.K. citizens, or at least that it
should guide domestic courts in the task of interpreting and applying
English law. He held—and on this question he was clearly right at the
time—that the Convention “[did] not, as a matter of English law, confer
any direct rights on the plaintiff that he can enforce in the English
courts.”136 On use of the ECHR to assist the court in identifying the
content of English law, Megarry conceded that “if the question before me
were one of construing a statute enacted with the purpose of giving effect
to obligations imposed by the convention, the court would readily seek to
construe the legislation in a way that would effectuate the convention
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Id. Megarry’s reasoning is of course strikingly reminiscent of that expressed by Chief
Justice Taft’s majority opinion in Olmstead v. United States. See supra notes 16–19 and
accompanying text.
132
Malone, 2 All E. R. at 631 (quoting 8 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 843 (4th ed.
2004)).
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Id. at 632.
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Id. at 644.
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Id.
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Id. at 647.
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rather than frustrate it.”137 However, Megarry found, “no relevant
legislation of that sort is in existence,” and where Parliament has
abstained from legislating on a point that is plainly suitable for
legislation, it is indeed difficult for the court to lay down new rules of
common law or equity that will carry out the Crown’s treaty obligations,
or to discover for the first time that such rules have always existed.138
Megarry concluded by revisiting the question of whether the absence
of statutory controls, as such, rendered the practice of telephone tapping
in Britain unlawful. He alluded to the fact that earlier in his opinion he
had held that
[i]f the tapping of telephones by the Post Office at the
request of the police can be carried out without any breach
of the law, it does not require any statutory or common law
power to justify it: it can lawfully be done simply because
there is nothing to make it unlawful.139
He concluded that now that he had “held that . . . tapping can indeed
be carried out without committing any breach of the law, the contention
[that the absence of any grant of powers to the executive renders
telephone tapping unlawful] necessarily fails.”140
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Id. at 647–48.
Id. at 648. Here—and earlier at pp. 635–38—Megarry devoted considerable attention
to the ECHR, to the G10 statute, and to the ECtHR’s decision in the Klass case. He noted
that “[n]ot a single one of [the] safeguards [contained in the G10 statute] is to be found as a
matter of established law in England,” and that “it is impossible to read the judgment in the
Klass case without it becoming abundantly clear that a system which has no legal
safeguards whatever has small chance of satisfying the requirements of [the ECtHR].” Id.
He then remarked that the absence of statutory safeguards rendered telephone tapping “a
subject which cries out for legislation.” Id. at 649.
139
Id. at 638.
140
Id. at 649.
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4. The Aftermath of Malone
In response to Vice-Chancellor Megarry’s judgment in Malone, the Home
Secretary addressed Parliament.141 He stated that the government had
considered “with great care” Vice-Chancellor Megarry’s suggestion that the
use of interception should be governed by legislation.142 However, he went
on to say that in the view of the government the interception of
communications
is, by definition, a practice that depends for its effectiveness
and value upon being carried out in secret, and cannot therefore
be subject to the normal processes of parliamentary control. Its
acceptability in a democratic society depends on its being
subject to ministerial control, and on the readiness of the public
and their representatives in Parliament to repose their trust in
the Ministers concerned to exercise that control
responsibly. . . . The Government have come to the clear
conclusion that [existing] procedures, conditions and
safeguards [are] a good and sufficient protection for the liberty
of the subject, and would not be made significantly more
effective for that purpose by being embodied in legislation.
The Government have accordingly decided not to introduce
legislation on these matters.143
Malone responded to his defeat in the High Court by submitting an
application to the European Commission of Human Rights.144 On December
17, 1982, the Commission declined to assess the merits of Britain’s nonstatutory arrangements for authorization and oversight of wiretapping and
held instead that the British system failed to satisfy the “threshold”
141

982 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1980) 205–20 (U.K.) (remarks of Secretary of State for
the Home Department William Whitelaw).
142
Id. col. 207.
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Id.
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Prior to 1998, applications alleging a violation of rights protected by the ECHR were
initially submitted to the European Commission, a body consisting of lawyers but not
necessarily judges. An applicant could not appeal an adverse decision of the Commission, but
the Commission itself could refer a case to the ECtHR (and could do so irrespective of the
direction of its decision). In 1998, the Commission was abolished and applications are now
submitted directly to the European Court. See ECTHR, ECHR OVERVIEW: 1959–2015, at 10,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592015_ENG.pdf.
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requirement of Article 8(2) of the ECHR that any interference with privacy
rights protected by Article 8(1) must be “in accordance with the law.”145
5. The European Court of Human Rights Decision
On May 16, 1983, the European Commission referred the Malone case to
the European Court of Human Rights.146 Like the European Commission,
the ECtHR declined to assess the merits of Britain’s non-statutory
interception regime, and held instead that it violated Article 8 because it was
“not in accordance with the law.”147 At the same time, the court elected to
use the case as a vehicle for setting forth substantial components of what
would become an oft-repeated body of “black letter law” on secret
surveillance.148
The court first asserted what was obvious: that the ECHR required, at a
minimum, that any national system of authorization and oversight of
interception of communications “must have some basis in domestic law.”149
It promptly stiffened this basic requirement, however, by articulating two
additional features that it would henceforth regard as essential for purposes
of assessing interception legislation. “Firstly,” the court said,
the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able
to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of
the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm
cannot be regarded as “law” unless it is formulated with
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his
conduct: he must be able—if need be with appropriate
advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may
entail.150
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Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 385, paras. 118–145
(Eur. Com. H.R., 1982). See also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
146
Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57533.
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Id. paras. 66–80.
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See, e.g., Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 151–153
(2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.itn/eng?i=001-98473.
149
Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 66.
150
Id. (quoting Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser.
A) para. 49 (1979), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57584; Silver v. United
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The court conceded that “the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean
that an individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely
to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct
accordingly.”151 Nevertheless, the court said,
the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the
conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort
to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the
right to respect for private life and correspondence.152
The court then wrapped up its articulation of the “general principles”
relevant to deciding whether a government’s system of interception of
communications would qualify as being “in accordance with the law.” Since
the implementation of measures of secret surveillance is “not open to
scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large,” the court held
that
it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion
granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an
unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate the
scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient
clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in
question, to give the individual adequate protection against
arbitrary interference.153
When the foregoing principles were applied to the practice of telephone
tapping in Britain, the outcome was predictable.154 The ECtHR concluded
that in England and Wales the law

Kingdom, App. No. 5947/72, 1983 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5, paras. 87–88 (1983), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57577.).
151
Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 67.
152
Id.
153
Id. para. 68.
154
Widespread belief that the ECtHR would condemn the practice of telephone tapping in
Britain for failing to satisfy the requirement that any interference with privacy rights must be
“in accordance with the law” dates at least from Vice-Chancellor Megarry’s 1979 decision in
Malone. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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does not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner
of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public
authorities. To that extent, the minimum degree of legal
protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in
a democratic society is lacking [and therefore] the interferences
with the applicant’s right under Article 8 to respect for his
private life and correspondence . . . were not “in accordance
with the law.”155
6. Interception of Communications Act 1985
The ECtHR’s decision in Malone finally prompted the British
government to enact legislation. However, what the court had decided in
Malone was that the practice of interception of communications in Britain
failed to satisfy the threshold requirement that any interference with Article 8
privacy rights must be “in accordance with the law.” This decision was
based, in turn, solely on the fact that existing arrangements for intercepting
communications had not been embodied in a written law.156 The government
decided to take advantage of the limited scope of the court’s decision by
requesting that Parliament give statutory expression, albeit with some
important modifications, to the status quo.157
The Interception of Communications Act 1985 made it a crime to
intentionally “intercept a communication in the course of its transmission by
post or by means of a public telecommunication system.”158 However, a
person was not guilty of an offense if “the communication is intercepted in
obedience to a warrant issued by the Secretary of State.”159
Section 2 of the Act then granted the Secretary of State the power to issue
interception warrants.160 The Act prescribed that the Secretary of State “shall
not issue a warrant . . . unless he considers that the warrant is necessary (a) in
the interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or
155

Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 79–80.
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The legislation passed by Parliament—the Interception of Communications Act 1985—
was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 1, §1-20 (U.K.) [hereinafter RIPA 2000].
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detecting serious crime; or (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the economic
well-being of the United Kingdom.”161
Requests for warrants to conduct internal or domestic wiretapping and
other forms of covert surveillance originate primarily with the police and the
Security Service (MI5) and are submitted for approval to the Secretary of
State for the Home Department.162 According to the initial report of Lord
Lloyd, the first Interception of Communications Commissioner, the basic
procedure for the issuance of a warrant is that
[w]hen an application arrives at the Home Office (I take the
Home Office as typical) it is processed by the Warrants
Unit . . . to ensure that the application is in order, and that the
grounds put forward come within Section 2(2) of the Act. If
there is any doubt, the application is referred back. If the
application is approved . . . it is referred to the Permanent
Under Secretary [and only then] is put before the Home
Secretary for his personal approval.163
The 1985 Act crafted two mechanisms, in addition to the warrant process
itself, to oversee interception of communications by law enforcement and
intelligence-gathering officials. First, the Act established the position of
Interception of Communications Commissioner and specified that the
Commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister and would be “a
person who holds or has held a high judicial office.”164 The three principal
responsibilities of the Commissioner were (1) “to keep under review the
carrying out by the Secretary of State of the functions conferred upon him by
[the 1985 Act],”165 (2) to respond to requests for assistance from the

161

Id. § 2(2).
Other secretaries of state—e.g., the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary—are
also authorized to issue warrants. In particular, requests from GCHQ to conduct external or
strategic surveillance are ordinarily submitted to the Foreign Secretary. See INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REPORT, 2011–12, H.C. 496, at 5, 16 (U.K.).
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For further discussion of the role of the Commissioner, see infra notes 164–68 and
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accompanying text.
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Interception of Communications Tribunal,166 and (3) to make an annual
report to the Prime Minister.167
Commissioners soon adopted two practices. First, they began examining
a random sample of warrants issued by the Secretary of State. Second, they
paid regular visits to the police, the intelligence services, and the other
agencies authorized to apply to the Secretary of State for interception
warrants. The findings from these inspections and visits are presented in an
annual report to the Prime Minister.168
The second oversight mechanism established by the 1985 Act was the
Interception of Communications Tribunal. The tribunal was comprised of
“five members each of whom shall be a barrister, advocate or solicitor of not
less than ten years’ standing.”169 It was charged with investigating
applications from “[a]ny person who believes that communications sent to or
by him have been intercepted.”170 In fulfilling this task, the tribunal was
instructed to investigate “whether there is or has been a relevant warrant,”171
and, where such a warrant exists, to investigate “whether there has been any
contravention of sections 2 to 5 [of the Act].”172
The tribunal was next instructed that when it investigates a complaint, it
should apply “the principles applicable by a court on an application for
judicial review.”173 British courts at the time possessed the power of
166

Id. § 8(1)(b). For further discussion of the role of the tribunal, see infra notes 169–85
and accompanying text.
167
ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 8(6). The Commissioner’s responsibilities are today set
forth in sections 57–64 of RIPA 2000.
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See, e.g., INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REPORT, 2009-10, H.C. 341,
¶ 2.1 (U.K.), available at http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2009%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
I have decided to continue with the practice followed by my predecessors of
making twice yearly visits to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence
Service, Government Communications Headquarters, [various police
agencies], the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the
Scottish Government and the Ministry of Defence. . . . Prior to each visit, I
obtain a complete list of warrants issued or renewed . . . since my previous
visit.
I then select, largely at random, a sample of warrants for
inspection. . . . In the course of my visit I satisfy myself that those warrants
fully meet the criteria of RIPA [and] that proper procedures have been
followed.
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“judicial review of administrative action,” that is, the power to declare ultra
vires the decisions of executive and administrative officials on whom
Parliament, by law, had conferred decision-making power. There were
numerous relatively specific grounds on which a court could overturn an
official’s decision, but it was also theoretically possible to do so on the
residual ground that the decision was “unreasonable.”
In a case decided in 1947, however, Lord Greene of the Court of Appeal
articulated a remarkably lenient definition of “unreasonable.”174 According
to Lord Greene, a court could invalidate the decision of an executive or
administrative official, but only if the court was convinced that the decision
was “so unreasonable that no reasonable [decision maker] could ever have
come to it.”175 Lord Greene’s definition gained wide acceptance and
thereafter became known as “Wednesbury unreasonableness.”176
In the context of interception of communications, the statutory instruction
to apply “the principles applicable by a court on an application for judicial
review” meant that the tribunal was prohibited from overturning the decision
of the Secretary of State to issue an interception warrant unless it believed
that the decision was “so unreasonable that no reasonable Secretary of State
could ever have come to it.”177 In addition, as we have seen, the Act
authorized the issuance of warrants to achieve three broadly defined sets of
goals: to protect national security, to prevent or detect serious crime, and to
safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.178 Finally, the
Act conferred on the Secretary of State subjective discretion to issue a
warrant whenever “he considers that the warrant is necessary” to achieve
these goals. The predictable result was that numerous commentators
expressed serious doubts about the efficacy of the tribunal as a check on the
Secretary of State’s exercise of executive power.179
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Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (1947),
available at http://bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1947/1.html.
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Id. at 234.
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See generally G.L. Peiris, Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Expanding Canvas, 46
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See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
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See ICA 1985, supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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Tappers’ Charter?, 1986 P.L. 8; Graham Zellick, Government Beyond Law, 1985 P.L. 283;
Ian J. Lloyd, The Interception of Communications Act 1985, 49 M.L.R. 86 (1986); Iain
Cameron, Telephone Tapping and the Interception of Communications Act 1985, 37 N.I.L.Q.
126 (1986).
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In fact, doubts about the degree to which the 1985 Act realistically
addressed the problem of executive power to engage in telephone tapping
went beyond skepticism about the tribunal’s ability to strictly scrutinize the
Secretary of State’s decisions. The Act instructed the tribunal that if it
concluded that sections 2 to 5 of the Act had been contravened, it was to
“give notice to the applicant” and to “make a report” to the Prime
Minister.180 If, on the other hand, the tribunal were to “come to any [other]
conclusion,” it was instructed to “give notice to the applicant stating that
there has been no contravention of [sections 2 to 5 of the Act] in relation to a
relevant warrant.”181 Such “notice,” of course, would not inform the
applicant whether his communications had or had not been intercepted, only
that, if they had been, the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant had
not, in the opinion of the tribunal, been “Wednesbury unreasonable.” For
any applicant other than one against whom the Secretary of State had grossly
misused his statutory power, the trip to the tribunal was therefore both
fruitless and uninformative.182
To ensure, moreover, that the tribunal was the final stop for applicants
believing themselves to be under surveillance, the 1985 Act prescribed that
the tribunal’s decision “shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be
questioned in any court.”183 This prohibition on judicial review of the
tribunal’s decisions by an ordinary court was intended to insulate the
decisions of the tribunal from further scrutiny unless an individual decision
of the tribunal, or the modus operandi of the tribunal itself, was successfully
challenged in the ECtHR.
Finally, there was the question of whether someone whose
communications had been intercepted could or would learn by any other
means whether an interception had occurred. On this issue, the 1985 Act
180

ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 7(4).
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182
After the passage of RIPA 2000, the Interception of Communications Tribunal was
replaced by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). RIPA now forbids the Secretary of State
from issuing an interception warrant unless he believes not only that the warrant is
“necessary,” but also that “the conduct authorized by the warrant is proportionate to what is
sought to be achieved by that conduct.” RIPA 2000, supra note 157, § 5(2). As a result, the
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prescribed that “[i]n any proceedings before any court or tribunal”—apart
from the Interception of Communications Tribunal itself, whose proceedings
were ordinarily closed both to the applicant and to his or her legal
representative—“no evidence shall be adduced and no question in crossexamination shall be asked which . . . tends to suggest . . . that an offence
[under section 1 of the Act] has been committed [e.g., by a government
official, a police officer, or a public telecommunications operator] or . . . that
a warrant has been or is to be issued to any of those persons.”184 Thus, the
Act gave statutory force to the Home Office policy of refusing to rely on
intercept evidence in judicial proceedings and refusing to confirm or deny
whether interception had ever occurred.185
7. The Interception of Communications Act and Individual Rights
From an American perspective, it is easy to see why civil libertarians and
other commentators in the United Kingdom viewed the Interception of
Communications Act 1985 with consternation and alarm. The legislation
constituted statutory recognition of the power of the state to engage in
interception of postal and telephone communications. However, it located
the power to issue interception warrants exclusively in the person of the
Secretary of State. Moreover, it authorized the Secretary to issue warrants in
three broad categories of circumstances whenever he considered it
“necessary” to do so. The Act conferred general oversight responsibility on
a figure who was required to hold or have held “high judicial office” but who
was appointed by, and reported to, the Prime Minister. It established a
tribunal consisting of senior members of the legal profession to which an
individual who believed himself or herself to have been under surveillance
could apply. However, it authorized the tribunal to conduct its deliberations
without the participation of the applicant or his or her legal representative.
Moreover, it instructed the tribunal to reach conclusions about the legality of
an interception warrant by asking itself whether the Secretary of State’s
decision to issue the warrant had been one that was “so unreasonable that no
reasonable Secretary of State could ever have come to it.”186 Finally, it
instructed the tribunal to inform an applicant—either one whose
184
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See supra note 114 and accompanying text. RIPA 2000 perpetuates the total exclusion of
interception evidence from criminal trials and other public proceedings. See RIPA 2000,
supra note 157, § 17.
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communications had not been intercepted or one whose communications had
been intercepted, in the opinion of the tribunal, pursuant to a lawfully issued
warrant—that there had been “no contravention” of the statutory provisions
governing the issuance of warrants.
In addition to the foregoing features, the 1985 Act contained other glaring
departures from the widely held belief, at least among legal scholars and civil
libertarians, that courts should play a key role in approving or at least in
reviewing executive branch decisions to engage in interception of
communications. The Act endeavored to make the tribunal the exclusive
forum in which citizens could challenge suspected governmental interception
of postal or telephone communications by prescribing that decisions of the
tribunal “shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any
court.” In addition, the Act forbade any use of interception evidence in court
or any reference in court to the fact that interception had occurred. The
obvious question that arose at the time of the Act’s passage was whether it
could possibly satisfy the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR. The
prevailing view, at the time, was that it could not.187
B. The Run-up to RIPA, 1985–2000
Parliament’s decision to go no further than to give statutory expression to
the status quo was regarded by many as an inadequate response to the
ECtHR’s insistence that the British government adopt legislation to govern
the use of wiretapping. In addition, it was widely recognized that forms of
covert surveillance other than wiretapping continued to be exempt from
statutory regulation. Lastly, none of Britain’s principal intelligence
agencies—the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6),
and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)—were subject
to statutory control. Predictably, political pressure began to build within
Britain to eliminate these glaring gaps in the coverage of the written law.
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See, e.g., Leigh, supra note 179, at 18 (noting “there is nothing in the [1985] Act which
gives any cause to believe that the rights of the individual have been significantly safeguarded
against arbitrary interference by the State.”); Zellick, supra note 179, at 308 (arguing portions
of the 1985 Act demonstrate the British government “is not fully subject to the law”);
Cameron, supra note 179, at 149 (arguing the 1985 Act is at most a “minimalist interpretation
of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights”);
Lloyd, supra note 179, at 94 (noting “it may be doubted” whether the provisions of the 1985
Act meet the requirements of the ECHR). See also infra notes 215–23, 234–72 and
accompanying text.
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1. National Security, Telephone Tapping, and the Massiter Revelations
The Security Service (MI5) was founded in 1909 and is responsible today
for responding, within Britain, to domestic and foreign threats to national
security.188 In 1937, the government determined that the Security Service,
along with the police, should secure a warrant from the Secretary of State for
the Home Department before engaging in wiretapping.189 The criteria for
issuance of a warrant were first published in the Birkett Report, and they
included the stipulation that the Secretary of State should not issue a warrant
to the Security Service unless there is “a major subversive, terrorist or
espionage activity that is likely to injure the national interest.”190
Catherine Massiter worked in MI5 from 1981 to 1983.191 In 1985, she
went public with a set of damning allegations about the way the nonstatutory warrant-granting process in national security cases functioned
during her employment with the agency. In particular, Massiter made three
specific claims, each of which was based on her personal knowledge: first,
she alleged that the Secretary of State had issued a warrant of questionable
legality to wiretap the telephone of John Cox, a long-time member of the
British Communist Party who was also an official of the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament, Britain’s leading anti-nuclear peace group.192 Second,
she alleged that MI5 maintained files on Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harman,
two officials of the National Council for Civil Liberties, which at the time
was Britain’s most prominent civil liberties group.193 Finally, she alleged
that as a by-product of the wiretap on John Cox’s telephone, MI5 classified
Hewitt and Harman as “communist sympathisers” and had included in their
188
The Security Service acquired its enduring, if unofficial, title of “MI5” when, in 1916,
the then seven-year-old Secret Service Bureau was incorporated into the new Directorate of
Military Intelligence. See CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, DEFEND THE REALM: THE AUTHORIZED
HISTORY OF MI5, at 3–28 (2009).
189
See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text.
190
BIRKETT REPORT, supra note 98, ¶ 67.
191
Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979. Massiter’s employment with MI5
thus coincided with the early years of the Thatcher Government.
192
Massiter’s allegation is detailed in affidavits provided to the High Court in a legal
challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant. The case was brought by Cox
and two other officials of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament with whom Cox spoke by
phone on a regular basis. R. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, ex parte Ruddock, [1987] 2
All E.R. 518 (Q.B.).
193
The National Council for Civil Liberties was founded in 1934. In 1989, it changed its
name to Liberty. See Liberty Timeline, LIBERTY, http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/wh
o-we-are/history/liberty-timeline.
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files information about their personal lives, their political opinions, and their
professional activities.194
Based on Massiter’s allegations, John Cox and two colleagues requested
judicial review in the High Court of the legality of the Secretary of State’s
decision to issue an interception warrant. Judge Taylor’s decision in the case
was issued shortly after passage of the Interception of Communications Act
1985.195 Taylor noted that the Act conferred jurisdiction to investigate
complaints of unlawful wiretapping on the Interception of Communications
Tribunal, and that the courts would “henceforth cease to have any
supervisory or investigatory function in the field of interceptions.”196
However, Taylor declined to accept the government’s argument that the
present litigation was “merely academic.”197 Instead, he asserted that “[i]f
wrongdoing were proved”—that is, if the Secretary of State had issued a
warrant in contravention of the government’s non-statutory guidelines—“the
court should [not] shrink from declaring [that fact].”198 The government
adhered to its policy of neither confirming nor denying that wiretapping had
occurred but submitted an affidavit assuring the court that “no warrant has
been issued which has not complied [with the existing non-statutory criteria
requiring the existence of a ‘major subversive activity’].”199 On the basis of
the government’s assurance, and without holding any sort of hearing, Taylor
concluded that the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant had not
been “Wednesbury unreasonable,” and that therefore “these applications
must be refused.”200
Three years later, the European Commission resolved Hewitt and
Harman’s claim that the Security Service had improperly collected and
retained information on their beliefs and activities.201 Since its inception, the
Security Service had not been governed by parliamentary legislation.202 As a
194
Massiter’s second and third allegations are recounted in Hewitt and Harman’s application
to the European Commission on Human Rights. See Hewitt and Harman v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 12175/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 657 (1989).
195
The legislation had taken effect on April 10, 1986.
196
Ruddock, supra note 192, at 528.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 524. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
200
Ruddock, supra note 192, at 534–35.
201
Hewitt & Harman, App. No. 12175/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 657 (1989).
202
The mandate of the Security Service was contained in a six-paragraph Directive issued in
1952 by the Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell-Fife, to the Director-General of the Service.
See Hewitt & Harman, App. No. 12175/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 661; LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH,
supra note 11, at 517.
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result, the Commission held that the interference with the applicants’ rights
under Article 8(1) “was not ‘in accordance with the law’ as required by
Article 8(2),” and that therefore the United Kingdom was in breach of its
obligations under the ECHR.203
2. The Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994
In a resolution adopted in the wake of the European Commission’s
decision in Hewitt and Harman, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe noted that it had been “informed by the Government of the United
Kingdom that the Security Service Act 1989 came into force on 18
To satisfy the ECHR’s requirement that any
December 1989.”204
interference with rights must be “in accordance with the law,” the Security
Service Act placed the Security Service on a statutory footing, subject to the
authority of the Secretary of State for the Home Department.205 In addition,
following the template introduced by the Interception of Communications
Act 1985, the Act created a Security Service Commissioner and a Security
Service Tribunal.206
The Security Service Act 1989 did not change the status quo with regard
to wiretapping. Since 1937, the Security Service had been obliged to seek
warrants from the Secretary of State before engaging in such surveillance,
and this arrangement was placed on a statutory footing when Parliament
passed the Interception of Communications Act in 1985. The principal
innovation of the 1989 Act was to establish a system whereby the Security
Service was also obliged to seek warrants from the Secretary of State for
“entry on or interference with property,”207 that is, for operations in which
there was entry to property either to seize or photograph items or to install a
listening device.208
The transformation of the United Kingdom’s security and intelligence
agencies was taken a step further with Parliament’s passage of the
Intelligence Services Act 1994. The Act placed Britain’s other two principal
intelligence agencies—the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the
203
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Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)—on a statutory
footing.209 These agencies, like the Security Service, were made subject to
the authority of the Secretary of State, from whom they were required to
obtain a warrant before undertaking any “entry on or interference with
property.”210 Pursuant to the Interception of Communications Act 1985, the
agencies also remained obligated to seek a warrant from the Secretary of
State before engaging in wiretapping.
3. The Labour Government and Policy Change
The election of a Labour government headed by Tony Blair in 1997
brought to a head a number of policy debates anchored in concerns about the
United Kingdom’s embarrassing defeats in Strasbourg, and the haphazard
process by which Parliament and the courts had been addressing the status of
secret surveillance.211 The government responded by announcing its
intention to introduce in Parliament not only a “Human Rights Act”—the
purpose of which would be to “incorporate” the ECHR into British law—but
also comprehensive legislation to govern the authorization and use by
government officials of not only telephone wiretapping but also other forms
of covert surveillance.212 In November 1998, Parliament passed the Human
Rights Act, and scheduled it to take effect in October 2000.213 In February
2000, Parliament began consideration of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000, the government’s proposed comprehensive surveillance
legislation.214
As was customary, the government invited public feedback on the content
of the new legislation. Submissions were received from various sources,
including pressure groups dedicated to the protection of civil liberties and
human rights. The response of the human rights organization Liberty was

209

Intelligence Services Act 1994, c. 13, §§ 1, 3.
Id. §§ 5(1)–(2).
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS BILL, 1997, CM 3782 (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf.
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Nick Taylor, State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOCIETY 66
(2002).
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The Human Rights Act, EQUALITY & HUM. RTS. COMM’N (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.
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typical. The group strenuously opposed retention of the system of executive
warrants given statutory expression in the Interception of Communications
Act 1985.215 Liberty pointed out that while RIPA represented “an
improvement on the existing law,” it failed to recognize that “the case law of
the European Convention on Human Rights emphasises that prior judicial
sanction is the preferable safeguard for the citizen’s Article 8 privacy rights
in the investigative context.”216
4. The RIPA Debate in Parliament
Responsibility for defending the merits of RIPA in Parliament fell to the
Home Secretary, Jack Straw.217 Early in the debate, Straw was asked by
Simon Hughes, the chief spokesperson for the Liberal Democratic Party,
whether he could explain “why . . . the opportunity [was] not taken to do
what many democratic countries have done, and transfer the [power to
authorise interception of communications] from politicians or officials to a
judicial authority in the first instance?”218 In response, the Home Secretary
made several points. First, he assured Parliament that “[t]he powers that are
exercised by the Secretary of State—certainly by me and, I believe, by every
one of my predecessors—have been exercised very carefully.”219 Second, he
argued that “the system is judicially supervised,” because the Interception of
Communications Commissioner, who engages in ex post review of a random
sample of the Secretary of State’s decisions to issue a warrant, “is someone
of high judicial standing.”220 Finally, he argued that:
If one looks at the practice in other countries, it does not
necessarily follow that, just because a judicial warrant is
required, there is a greater safeguard for the individual. Indeed,
I suggest that, in quite a number of other countries, the fact that
a judicial warrant is required lessens the protection that is

215
LIBERTY, REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL: SECOND READING BRIEFING,
HOUSE OF LORDS (2000), available at https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/
files/may-2000-ripa.pdf.
216
Id.
217
613 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2000) 767 (U.K.).
218
Id. col. 769.
219
Id. col. 770.
220
Id.

282

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:237

offered to people because the judicial warrant acts as a fig leaf
for people’s human rights, and not as a serious safeguard.221
When the debate moved to the House of Lords, discussion of executive
versus judicial pre-approval of interception warrants continued. Addressing
a specific set of amendments intended to locate the power to issue warrants
in a judge, rather than the Secretary of State, the spokesperson for the Liberal
Democratic Party, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, took a conciliatory tone. He
cautioned that he was not suggesting that “the Secretary of State is
‘unfit’ . . . to undertake the task [of issuing interception warrants].”
Nevertheless, he said, “a considerable body of informed opinion in the
country now believes that this task would be better undertaken by a
judge.”222 The government’s spokesperson, Lord Bach, replied that
[t]he arguments put forward by those who advocate judicial
involvement do not at the end of the day persuade the
Government that that is the right course to take. We maintain
the view that authorising interception involves particularly
sensitive decisions that are properly a matter for the
executive. . . .
Of course, there is an important, vital place for judicial
involvement. That comes . . . in the independent judicial
oversight provided by the commissioners and the tribunal, who
are there to provide a remedy if the executive has acted outside
its statutory powers.223
As the debate drew to a close, the Liberal Democratic Party stood alone in
opposing the government’s decision to retain in the hands of the Secretary of
State the power to issue interception warrants.224 On July 26, 2000, RIPA
was enacted. Two days later it received the Royal Assent, and on October 2,
in tandem with the Human Rights Act 1998, it took effect.225
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5. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
In RIPA 2000, Parliament fulfilled the Blair government’s promise to
enact into law a comprehensive regime for the regulation of surveillancebased investigatory powers. RIPA perpetuated existing arrangements for the
regulation of telephone tapping. In addition, RIPA established rules for the
acquisition and disclosure of “communications data” and incorporated
previous legislation subjecting to statutory control “entry on or interference
with property” by the security and intelligence agencies226 and the police.227
Finally, the legislation prescribed rules for the use by various public agencies
of additional types of “covert surveillance,” including “intrusive
surveillance,” “directed surveillance,” and the deployment of “covert human
intelligence sources.”228
RIPA repealed the Interception of Communications Act 1985, and
replaced it with fresh provisions governing the interception of postal and
telephone communications.229 However, the interception provisions of RIPA
were nearly identical to those of the earlier law, albeit with some potentially
significant modifications. First, in keeping with long-standing doctrine of
the ECtHR, RIPA augmented the requirement that the Secretary of State
shall not issue an interception warrant unless he believes it is “necessary” to
do so with a requirement that he must also believe “that the conduct
authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved
by that conduct.”230 Second, the law mandated the promulgation of “Codes
of Practice” designed to provide the police and intelligence agencies with
practical guidance regarding “the exercise and performance of the powers
and duties mentioned [in the Act].”231 Finally, RIPA created a single
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) to assume the duties of the Interception
of Communications Tribunal, the Security Service Tribunal, and the
Intelligence Services Tribunal. The IPT was given jurisdiction “to
investigate any event that you believe has taken place against you, your
226
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228
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property or your communications, as long as it relates to the use of a covert
technique by a public authority regulated under [RIPA 2000] or a wider
human rights breach by the intelligence agencies.”232
6. Conclusion
In the decade and a half after 1985, the legal landscape relating to the
British government’s use of electronic surveillance and other investigatory
powers was transformed. By 1994, all three of the principal intelligence
agencies—MI5, MI6, and GCHQ—had been placed on a statutory footing,
and their power to engage in various forms of covert surveillance had been
subjected to statutory control. In 1997, Parliament enacted statutory
provisions to govern police interference with property for the purpose of
installing a listening device.233 In RIPA 2000, Parliament merged these and
other earlier changes into a comprehensive statutory regime to govern the use
of a broad spectrum of surveillance techniques by a variety of public bodies,
including, but not limited to, the police and the intelligence agencies.
Virtually every one of the foregoing statutory developments was
prompted by a successful or pending challenge to the status quo on the part
of litigants who had invoked the enforcement mechanisms of the ECtHR.
The reactive nature of the legislative policies enacted between 1985 and
2000 has fueled continuing skepticism among civil libertarians and other
commentators about the merits of British surveillance arrangements.234
There is dismay that the British government has not introduced a system of
judicial pre-approval of interception of communications, at least in
connection with ordinary criminal investigations.235 There is also alarm at
the care with which the government has succeeded in engineering the
exclusion of ordinary courts from any role in responding to citizens’
complaints.236 Finally, there is a lingering suspicion that the net effect of
Parliament’s legislative responses to ECtHR decisions has been to diminish
232
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(“Perhaps the most striking feature of the RIPA is the determination evinced under it to
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rather than to enhance citizens’ rights.237 What is undeniable is that in a
relatively brief fifteen year period Parliament succeeded in passing an
impressive body of statutory law designed to shield Britain from further
embarrassing losses in the ECtHR, and to respond, however grudgingly, to
the requirement of Article 8(2) of the ECHR that any interference with
Article 8(1) privacy rights must be both “in accordance with the law” and
“necessary in a democratic society.”
IV. RIPA 2000 IN THE EUROPEAN COURT: THE KENNEDY CASE
The passage of RIPA 2000 set the stage for a judgment by the ECtHR on
whether the British approach to telephone wiretapping was compatible with
Article 8 of the ECHR. The case, Kennedy v. United Kingdom,238 originated
a full twenty years earlier with an incident in which the applicant, Malcolm
Kennedy, was arrested for drunkenness and shared an overnight jail cell with
another man. When the cellmate was found dead the next morning, Kennedy
was charged with murder. Although he alleged that the police were covering
up their own responsibility for the death, Kennedy was eventually convicted
of manslaughter. Upon his release in 1996, he became convinced that he was
the target of illegal telephone tapping by the police, and in 2001, he lodged a
complaint with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. On January 17, 2005, the
IPT notified Kennedy that “no determination had been made in his
favour.”239 On July 12, 2005, Kennedy applied to the European Court of
Human Rights.
The ECtHR chose to use Kennedy’s complaint to address “the general
compliance [with Article 8 of the ECHR] of the RIPA regime for internal
communications.”240 The court was determined, in other words, not to
decide whether the applicant’s telephone calls had actually been intercepted,
237
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and, if they had been, whether the interception was lawful. Instead, it
signaled its intention to assess the “facial validity” of the provisions of RIPA
that govern the interception of non-international telephone and postal
communications. Incorporated in this assessment was the question of
whether the procedures followed by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in
addressing individual complaints were compatible with Article 6 of the
ECHR, which guarantees that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing [by] an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”241
A. The Article 8 Complaint
The ECtHR prefaced its assessment of the facial validity of RIPA by
summarily rejecting the government’s argument that Kennedy lacked
standing to bring the case. According to the court, Kennedy could challenge
RIPA because he had brought his complaint “on the basis of the very
existence of measures permitting secret surveillance.”242
The court then addressed various specific objections to the surveillance
regime established by the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and
perpetuated in RIPA 2000. First, the court concluded that the terms
“national security” and “serious crime”—the broad grounds on which the
Secretary of State is authorized to base decisions to issue interception
warrants—were sufficiently clear to satisfy the court’s “foreseeability”
requirement.243 The court expressly held that interception legislation is not
required “to set out exhaustively by name the specific offences which may
give rise to interception.”244 In addition, the court upheld the Conventioncompatibility of RIPA’s provisions on the duration of interception warrants
and on the procedures for “examining, using and storing data” and other
components of the process of dealing with the product of an interception
order.245
In response to the absence of any mechanism in RIPA for judicial preapproval of surveillance requests—and in light of its own oft-repeated
assertion that in the area of secret surveillance, “it is in principle desirable to
241
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entrust supervisory control to a judge”246—the ECtHR warmly endorsed the
role of the Interception of Communications Commissioner. The court
described the Commissioner as a person who “holds or has held high judicial
office,” who is “independent of the executive and the legislature,” and who
in the exercise of his responsibilities “provides an important control of the
activities of the intercepting agencies and of the Secretary of State
himself.”247
With respect to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the sole domestic
forum authorized to entertain complaints of unlawful surveillance, the court
described the IPT as “an independent and impartial body,” and noted that it
was composed of persons who “hold or have held high judicial office or [are]
experienced lawyers.”248 The court also emphasized the IPT’s accessibility,
noting that it is a body to which “any person who suspects that his
communications have been or are being intercepted may apply,” irrespective
of whether they have been notified of that fact.249 Finally, the court noted
that there was “no evidence of any significant shortcomings in the
application and operation of the surveillance regime.”250 It concluded that
[h]aving regard to the safeguards [offered] by the supervision
of the Commissioner and the review of the IPT, the impugned
surveillance measures, insofar as they may have been applied
to the applicant in the circumstances outlined in the present
case, are justified under Article 8(2).251
B. The Article 6 Complaint
RIPA 2000 established the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and conferred
upon it exclusive jurisdiction to entertain complaints from individuals who
believe they have been the target of unlawful governmental wiretapping or
246
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other forms of covert surveillance.252 The law also confers on the Secretary
of State the power to draft the rules under which the tribunal will operate.253
In October of 2000, in conjunction with RIPA’s coming into force, the
Secretary of State promulgated the Tribunal’s Rules.254
The Rules prescribed that when the IPT agrees to investigate an
individual complaint, it “may” hold oral hearings, including hearings at
which “the complainant may make representations,” but it is under no duty to
do so. Further, the tribunal is authorized to hold “separate oral hearings.”255
Should the tribunal choose to hold a separate hearing to which the
government alone is invited, it is authorized to not disclose “to the
complainant or to any other person” the fact it has held, or proposes to hold,
such a hearing.256 It is also permitted to not disclose
to the complainant or to any other person . . . any information
or document disclosed or provided to the Tribunal in the course
of that hearing, or the identity of any witness at that hearing.257
Finally, the tribunal is instructed that its “proceedings, including any oral
hearings, shall be conducted in private.”258
Kennedy’s complaint to the IPT had argued that Article 6 of the ECHR
required that the tribunal’s proceedings must be adversarial in nature and
open to the public. Article 6 guarantees to everyone “a fair and public
hearing [by] an independent and impartial tribunal.”259 Kennedy argued that
this required that the tribunal’s proceedings take the form of a public oral
hearing with mutual disclosure and inspection of the parties’ evidence, that
oral evidence be open to cross-examination, and that “following its final
determination, the IPT [should] state its findings and give reasons for its
conclusions on each relevant issue.”260 Most of these requests, of course,
were wholly at odds with the constraints under which the tribunal had been
instructed to operate by the Secretary of State.
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The government defended the IPT’s operating procedures on the ground
“the overarching consideration was that an individual could not be notified of
interception measures while interception was ongoing or where notification
would jeopardise the capabilities or operations of intercepting agencies.”261
It reminded the ECtHR that RIPA conferred on the IPT “full powers to
obtain any material it considered necessary from relevant bodies,” including
the police, the intelligence agencies, and the Secretary of State, and it
insisted that “the procedure before the IPT offered as fair a procedure as
could be achieved in the context of secret surveillance powers.”262
The ECtHR prefaced its conclusions on the Article 6 question by noting
that in prior decisions it had held that “restrictions on the right to a fully
adversarial procedure [were permissible] where strictly necessary.”263 It also
“emphasise[d] that [IPT] proceedings related to secret surveillance measures
and that there was therefore a need to keep secret sensitive and confidential
information.”264 This consideration, the court said, “justifies restrictions in
the IPT proceedings.”265 In the court’s view, the question was “whether the
restrictions, taken as a whole, were disproportionate or impaired the very
essence of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.”266
The court then turned to specific rules that governed the IPT’s
investigation of individual complaints. First, the court considered the
tribunal’s strict limitations on the disclosure to the complainant of any
information provided to the tribunal, or even disclosure to the complainant of
the fact that the tribunal had held, or was proposing to hold, a separate oral
hearing to which the government alone would be invited. The court agreed
with the government that the alternatives, such as disclosure of redacted
documents or the appointment of special advocates, would not solve the
problem, because they could not “achieve[ ] the aim of preserving the
secrecy of whether any interception had taken place.”267 The court also
agreed with the government that conferring on the tribunal the discretion to
refuse to hold oral hearings at all was compatible with Article 6.268 Finally,
the court endorsed the government’s strict policy of refraining from
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providing post-surveillance notification to any targeted persons, even in
criminal investigations, and of neither confirming nor denying, in court or
anywhere else, that interception of communications had ever occurred. It
held that these goals “could be circumvented if an application to the IPT
resulted in a complainant being advised whether interception had taken
place. In the circumstances, it is sufficient that the applicant be advised that
no determination has been in his favour.”269 The court then reached its
overall conclusion that “the restrictions on the applicant’s rights in the
context of the proceedings before the IPT were both necessary and
proportionate and did not impair the very essence of the applicant’s Article 6
rights.”270
C. Conclusion
The ECtHR’s decision in Kennedy constituted a ringing endorsement of
the Convention-compatibility of the RIPA regime for interception of
communications in the United Kingdom. RIPA authorizes the government to
engage in interception of communications within the United Kingdom in
both criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering operations. The
Secretary of State for the Home Department is empowered to issue
interception warrants to both the police and counter-intelligence officials
provided he or she believes that it is “necessary” and “proportionate” to do
so in order to accomplish one or more of three broad objectives.271 The
ECtHR upheld the RIPA provisions authorizing executive warrants and
endorsed the mechanisms established by RIPA—including the Interception
of Communications Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal—
to oversee the Secretary of State’s exercise of the warrant-granting power. In
addition, the court upheld the arrangements for the nearly complete secrecy
that surrounds the IPT’s operations in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
investigate citizens’ complaints of unlawful surveillance by government
officials. The court concluded unanimously that RIPA’s complex and
distinctive mix of powers and safeguards rendered the British approach to
interception of communications and other forms of covert surveillance
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“necessary in a democratic society” and, as such, compatible with both
Article 6 and Article 8 of the ECHR.272
V. COMPARING BRITISH AND AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE LAW
It is time to venture some comparative conclusions about the merits of the
respective systems of authorization and oversight of interception of
communications in the United Kingdom and the United States. To do so, it
is instructive to look, first, at the structures, procedures, and actual operation
of the two systems, and, second, at statistics on the per capita incidence of
wiretapping in Britain, the United States, and other jurisdictions.
A. Structures, Procedures, and Operational Realities
In the United States, wiretap orders in criminal investigations are sought
from a state or federal judge pursuant to procedures established by Title III.
In operations aimed at acquiring foreign intelligence information, the
government is required to seek interception orders from a judge of the FISA
272

Kennedy, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras.169–170. Despite receiving the
approval of the ECtHR for their current surveillance regime, policy makers in the UK are on
the verge of instituting major changes. In 2015, and in direct response to Edward Snowden’s
2013 revelations, three major reports were issued. First, the Intelligence and Security
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authorization for interception warrants. See INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE,
PRIVACY AND SECURITY: A MODERN AND TRANSPARENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, 2015, H.C., at 7,
73–76 (U.K.). That same year, David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism
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and Intelligence Commission (ISIC). See DAVID ANDERSON, ISIC, REPORT OF THE
INVESTIGATORY POWERS REVIEW: A QUESTION OF TRUST 6–8 (2015), available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-question-of-trust-report-of-the-investigatory-powersreview. Members of the Commission—termed “Judicial Commissioners”—would take over
direct responsibility for approval of interception warrants in criminal cases and “national
security [cases] of a domestic nature.” Id. at 274. In cases in which the Secretary of State
certified that a warrant was required in the interests of “the defence and/or foreign policy of
the UK,” a Judicial Commissioner would exercise judicial review—presumably rather lenient
judicial review—of the Secretary of State’s certification. See id. at 270–75. Finally, the
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) also issued a report
recommending a “composite approach” similar to that advocated by David Anderson. See
RUSI, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE REVIEW: A DEMOCRATIC LICENCE TO
OPERATE 81–83, 97–100, 111–12 (2015), available at https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/
ISR-Report-press.pdf. For a brief discussion of the response of the Cameron and May
Governments and Parliament to the foregoing recommendations, as of October 2016, see infra
notes 317–29 and accompanying text.
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Court. In the United Kingdom, all requests for authority to engage in
interception of communications within the country are directed to the
Secretary of State for the Home Department. The Home Secretary is solely
responsible for issuing interception warrants not only to the Security Service
for intelligence-gathering purposes but also to the police for ordinary
criminal investigations.
The interception regimes of both the United States and the United
Kingdom therefore require operations-level executive branch law
enforcement and counter-intelligence officials to seek prior approval from a
third party for their decisions to resort to wiretapping. However, the United
States has embraced a decentralized system of judicial pre-approval that
owes its origins to perceived abuses of the warrant-granting power on the
part of British secretaries of state in the eighteenth century. In contrast, the
United Kingdom has chosen to vest power in the official whose conduct
prompted the Americans to become leading proponents, in the latter half of
the twentieth century, of the supposed virtues of judicial oversight of the use
of electronic surveillance.
Which system does a better job of achieving the oft-repeated goal of
striking a “proper balance” between the need to combat crime and protect
national security, on the one hand, and the need to safeguard citizens’
privacy rights, on the other? The answer is not obvious. On the one hand, a
centralized system of interception warrants would seem by definition to
heighten the risk that government surveillance could be directed at political
dissidents or could otherwise be used for improper or oppressive purposes.
On the other hand, as the authors of the Birkett Report remarked, it is
arguable that in a decentralized system in which “a number of magistrates or
judges [have] the power to issue such warrants, the control of the use to
which methods of interception can be put would be weaker than under the
present system.”273 On this issue, it is only fair to say that we do not know,
in the abstract and with certainty, which system is superior.
What can be said is that the decentralization of the American system, at
least in federal cases, is easily exaggerated. Warrant requests are funneled
through the Electronic Surveillance Unit of the Office of Enforcement
Operations of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, after
which they are presented to the Attorney General or a specially designated
high-level Justice Department official for signature.274 In the case of the
273
274
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FISA Court, applications are prepared and filed by the National Security
Division of the Justice Department and require the approval of the Attorney
General.275 In the United States, therefore, the DOJ is responsible for
“quality control” of warrant applications, and, at least within individual
presidential administrations, there is probably substantial consistency in the
standards to which warrant applications are held prior to being forwarded to
the chambers of individual federal judges.276 On its face, the process of
preparing warrant requests for such judges bears a striking resemblance to
the steps taken by the British Home Office in preparing warrant requests for
eventual submission to the Secretary of State.277
1. Operational Realities of the Warrant-Granting Process
What do we know about how state and federal judges in the United States
and the Secretary of State in the United Kingdom actually exercise their
warrant-granting power? The answer, it seems, is quite a lot but not nearly
enough.
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, raw statistics on the
ease of gaining approval for wiretapping are accessible and fairly
straightforward. In the United States, between 1968 and the end of 2013,
state and federal judges authorized some 55,386 interception warrants
pursuant to Title III.278 In that same period, judges denied a total of thirtynine warrant requests.279 In the FISA Court, between 1979 and 2011, judges
approved a total of 32,087 government applications for authority to conduct
electronic surveillance and/or physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes.280 In that period, a total of twelve applications were rejected.281
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Turning to the United Kingdom, in the decade between 2001 and the end
of 2010, the Home Secretary issued a total of 16,668 warrants for domestic
interception of communications.282 It is safe to assume that few requests are
denied. However, little information is available on this question in the
Annual Reports of the Interception of Communications Commissioner. In
his Annual Report for 2010, for instance, the Commissioner noted only that
“[t]he outright refusal of an application is rare,” but he provided no further
details.283
The bottom line is that in both the United States and the United Kingdom,
the ratio of warrant denials to warrant approvals is miniscule. This does little
more, however, than raise the perennial question of whether the low rate of
denials is the product of hopelessly lenient standards for approving
interception warrants or is instead a reflection of the self-restraint and
professionalism of operations-level executive branch officials.
Civil
libertarians are quick to embrace the former explanation. Government
officials are equally fond of the latter explanation. Arriving at a true
assessment of whether a particular system of surveillance authorization and
oversight exhibits a satisfactory level of rigor in balancing privacy against
security and public order is not an easy task.
2. Ex Post Scrutiny of Authorized Wiretapping
The situation is not significantly improved if we examine what we know
about ex post scrutiny of the merits of granted warrants. With respect to
FISA Court orders, post-surveillance notification of targets does not occur
unless the government elects to prosecute the target for a criminal offense.284
As a result, most FISA surveillance begins and ends without anyone other
282
This figure is calculated from statistics published in the Interception of Communications
Commissioner’s annual report for 2001 through 2010. Beginning in 2011, the Commissioners
have reported only a total figure for “the Secretaries”—including not only the Home Secretary
but also the Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Scottish Ministers. Warrants issued by
the Home Secretary authorize “domestic” wiretapping in the UK for both law enforcement
and intelligence-gathering purposes and thus correspond most closely to the combined number
of two categories of American warrants: (1) Title III warrants approved by state and federal
judges and (2) FISA Court warrants issued for domestic surveillance. For purposes of
comparative analysis, therefore, I will rely primarily on British and American figures reported
for years prior to 2011. See INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL
REPORT, 2011–12, H.C. 496, at 29 (U.K.).
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INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT, 2010, H.C. 1239,
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than the FISA Court and the government being aware of that fact. When
prosecutions do occur, defendants are informed that the government intends
to rely on FISA-derived evidence, and, in about 35–40 cases, they have
sought disclosure. However, no defendant has ever succeeded in gaining
access to any “applications or orders or other materials,” let alone in
convincing a judge to order suppression of the resulting evidence.285
Title III includes a much more expansive post-surveillance notification
requirement than FISA.286 Thus, there are numerous opportunities for
defendants (and others) to challenge the merits of a Title III interception
order. The problem here is the enormity of the data set. In the FISA context,
Professor Patricia L. Bellia has highlighted the complete absence of
successful challenges to the introduction of FISA-derived evidence.287 After
doing so, she adds that “[a]lthough suppression is also quite rare in the Title
III context, the sheer number of suppression motions under Title III makes
tabulation and comparison impossible.”288
Focusing strictly on the United States, therefore, the absence of
substantive information about the soundness of the warrant-granting
decisions of FISA Court judges, combined with the unwieldy amount of
information about the fate of Title III challenges, makes it difficult to
compare the warrant-granting behavior of federal judges presiding over
criminal cases to that of federal judges who serve on the FISA Court. In
cases governed solely by Title III, the sheer quantity of relevant judicial
decisions inhibits ready comparison of the behavior of federal judges to that
of their state court counterparts.
It is equally difficult to reach objective comparative conclusions about the
care or professionalism with which American judges and British secretaries
of state execute their warrant-granting responsibilities. With respect to the
response of British secretaries of state to warrant requests, this Article has
already noted the Commissioner’s concession that “[t]he outright refusal of
an application is rare.”289 However, no specific information on the ratio of
grants to denials is publicly available, and thus the behavior of the Secretary
of State and that of American judges cannot easily be compared, apart from
noting that requests for warrants are very rarely denied in either jurisdiction.
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As for ex post scrutiny of alleged unlawful interception in the United
Kingdom, once the Home Secretary agrees to issue a warrant, challenges to
its lawfulness are channeled exclusively to the Interception of
Communications Tribunal (between 1986 and 2000) and the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal (2000 to the present). There are gaps in our knowledge, but
it does not appear that any allegation of unlawful telephone tapping
submitted to the ICA between 1986 and 2000 was upheld.290 With the
passage of RIPA 2000, the IPT assumed responsibility for hearing
complaints about various types of surveillance, including, but not limited to,
interception of communications. In 2005, the Tribunal upheld a complaint
for the first time, and it has upheld a handful of other complaints since;
however, none of the successful complaints alleged that the government was
engaged in unlawful telephone tapping.291 Thus, it does not appear that any
complaint of such tapping has ever been upheld.
3. Conclusion
Our ability to reach meaningful conclusions about the relative merits of
the British and American systems of interception of communications is
severely hampered by several features of the two systems. Analysis in both
systems is handicapped by the enigmatic significance of the near-perfect
record of executive officials in gaining approval for their warrant requests.
In addition, both jurisdictions are notable for the secrecy that surrounds key
components of their warrant-granting and warrant-reviewing processes.
Finally, the sheer magnitude of the body of judicial and other decisions
requiring scrutiny frustrates meaningful analysis. In the end, the only hope
for shedding light on the operational merits of the two systems may be to
devise an in-depth field study or a massive empirical study. In the meantime,
we know that interception of communications in the United States requires a
290
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judicial warrant and
executive warrant and
in both jurisdictions
information is either
unavailable.

interception in the United Kingdom requires an
that warrant requests from executive branch officials
are rarely denied. Beyond that, the available
overwhelming in scope, difficult to interpret, or

B. The Incidence of Wiretapping
Another approach to comparing the British and American surveillance
regimes to one another—and to regimes in operation in other countries—is to
look at statistics on the per capita incidence of authorized governmental
wiretapping.
This method of drawing comparisons is not without
weaknesses, because there will be national differences in the way in which
wiretap statistics are compiled and other factors that could produce
misleading conclusions. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine what we
know about the incidence of wiretapping in various jurisdictions as one way
of assessing the relationship between citizens and their governments and the
extent to which individual privacy is or is not adequately protected.
1. Wiretapping in the United States
In the United States, wiretap orders approved pursuant to Title III are
reported annually in the Wiretap Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, which includes statistics on orders issued
by both state and federal judges.292 Basic information on the number of
applications to the FISA Court for authority to conduct electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes is reported annually in a letter
from the Department of Justice to congressional leaders.293
As noted above, a total of 55,386 Title III warrants were issued by state
and federal judges between 1968 and 2013.294 Therefore, in the forty-six
year history of Title III, state and federal judges have issued an average of
about 1,204 warrants per year. Between 1979 and 2013, the FISA Court
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approved a total of 35,434 government applications for a FISA order.295
Thus, FISA Court orders have averaged roughly 1,012 per year.
Predictably, the number of Title III warrants has risen—from an average
of 679 per year in the twelve years between 1970 and 1981 to an average of
1,933 in the twelve years between 2000 and 2011.296 Thus, the frequency of
the issuance of such warrants has approximately tripled.297 Between 1980
and 1991, the FISA Court approved an average of 530 orders per year.298 In
the recent twelve-year period between 2000 and 2011, the court averaged
1,666 approvals per year. Thus, FISA Court orders, like Title III warrants,
have approximately tripled.299
In the twelve-year period between 2000 and 2011, the combined average
of Title III warrants and FISA Court orders issued every year—1,933 Title
III warrants plus 1,666 FISA Court orders—is about 3,600. Assuming a U.S.
population of 300 million people, state and federal courts and the FISA Court
thus issue about 1.2 interception warrants/orders per 100,000 persons per
year for the purpose of domestic collection of evidence of criminal activity
and domestic collection of foreign intelligence information.
2. Wiretapping in the United Kingdom
In the decade between 2001 and 2010, the Home Secretary issued 16,668
warrants for domestic interception of communications for the purpose of
combating serious crime and/or protecting national security.300 In recent
years, therefore, the average number of warrants issued every year has been
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about 1,666. Taking this figure at face value, and assuming a population of
about 60 million people, the Secretary of State issues about 2.75 warrants per
year per 100,000 persons. The incidence of the issuance of interception
warrants thus appears to be a little over twice as great in the United Kingdom
as in the United States.301
3. Wiretapping in Other Jurisdictions
To put these statistics in perspective, it is useful to examine what we
know about the incidence of wiretapping in other jurisdictions. For this
purpose, we can turn to recent ECtHR decisions on interception of
communications in Bulgaria and Moldova.
a. Bulgaria
In 2007, the ECtHR examined the Convention-compatibility of Bulgaria’s
Special Surveillance Means Act of 1997 (SSMA) and also examined the
manner in which the law operated in practice.302 The SSMA authorized
various police and internal security agencies to engage in wiretapping, and
judges were given responsibility for issuing warrants. After the issuance of a
warrant, however, control of the surveillance process reverted to the Minister
of Internal Affairs.303 In addition, according to the court, “under Bulgarian
law the persons subjected to secret surveillance are not notified of this fact at
any point in time and under any circumstances.”304
The ECtHR held that the SSMA, even as written, failed to satisfy the
requirement of Article 8(2) of the ECHR that any interference with rights
protected by Article 8(1) must be “in accordance with the law.”305 After
reviewing its precedents on “foreseeability” and “compatibility with the rule
301
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of law,”306 the court noted that “while in certain respects Bulgarian law fully
comports with the above requirements, in other respects it falls short.”307 In
particular, the court found fault with the fact that control of surveillance
reverted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs following its initial authorization
by a judge.308
The ECtHR also reviewed statistics on the number of wiretap warrants
issued by judges in the first place. It noted that a report issued by the
Bulgarian Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office found that in a two-year
period from 1999 through 2000, “more than 10,000 warrants were issued,
[and] that number does not even include the tapping of mobile phones.”309
Taken at face value, and based on a population of approximately 7.3 million,
the incidence of wiretapping in Bulgaria therefore works out to more than
seventy orders per 100,000 persons. If true, this means that the per capita
use of wiretapping in Bulgaria is roughly twenty-five times greater than in
the United Kingdom and more than fifty-five times greater than in the United
States. The court’s conclusion was that compared to other countries, “the
system of secret surveillance in Bulgaria is, to say the least, overused.”310
b. Moldova
Moldova ratified the ECHR in 1997. In 2002, members of a nongovernmental organization called “Lawyers for Human Rights” filed an
application with the ECtHR alleging that Moldovan law governing telephone
tapping violated Article 8 of the ECHR. Their challenge to Moldovan law
was resolved by the ECtHR in 2009.311
In Iordachi, the court examined Moldova’s Operational Investigative
Activities Act. The law prescribed that investigative measures “which
infringe lawful rights,” including the secrecy of telephone conversations,
“shall be permitted [only] with the authorisation of the investigating
judge.”312 A separate statute, the Code of Criminal Procedure, required that
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“after the end of an authorized interception [the] judge shall inform in
writing the persons whose conversations were intercepted.”313
In their application to the ECtHR, the lawyers challenging the Moldovan
regime of interception of communications told the court that in their
experience “no investigating judge had ever complied” with the obligation to
provide post-surveillance notification to persons whose telephone calls had
been intercepted.314 In addition, they provided the court with a letter from
the Head of the President’s Office of the Supreme Court of Justice indicating
that investigating judges had granted an average of 2,274 interception
authorizations per year in 2005–2007.315 In a country of 3.5 million, this
translates into roughly 65 authorizations per 100,000 inhabitants, and it
prompted the court to remark, as it had in AEIHR and Ekimdzhiev, that the
“figures show that the system of secret surveillance in Moldova is, to say the
least, overused.”316
4. Conclusion
The ECtHR’s decisions in AEIHR and Ekimdzhiev and in Iordachi are a
reminder that historical experience and political culture can play a major role
in the operation of a country’s surveillance regime, however much its
statutory components may resemble an American-style system requiring
judicial pre-approval and other safeguards against abuse of citizens’ privacy
rights. On its face, the Bulgarian system included judicial pre-approval of
wiretap decisions. The Moldovan system included judicial pre-approval of
wiretap decisions and post-surveillance notification by an investigating judge
of the targets of covert surveillance. In practice, however, both systems
exhibited serious weaknesses, and it was apparent to the ECtHR that neither
system had yet achieved much success in escaping the baleful effects of its
totalitarian past.
VI. CONCLUSION
The American system of authorized governmental interception of
communications—consisting not only of judicial pre-approval of executive
branch wiretapping decisions but also of innumerable individual decisions by
313
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both state and federal judges—stands in marked contrast to the concentration
of warrant-granting power in the hands of a single executive official in the
United Kingdom. The American system of judicial pre-approval is selfevidently more attractive to civil libertarians. In addition, the British system
exhibits a higher level of secrecy than the American system (although the
differences are not substantial in the case of covert surveillance aimed at
gathering intelligence and countering threats to national security). For this
reason as well, the American system is preferred by groups and individuals
who put a high premium on protection of privacy.
Looking at the systems as a whole, however, it is surprisingly difficult to
conclude that one is significantly more successful than the other at striking
the proper balance between the needs of the state and the rights of the
individual. While interception of communications in the United Kingdom is
firmly controlled by the government and thoroughly shrouded in secrecy,
executive branch officials operate within an elaborate system of judicial, or
at least “quasi-judicial,” safeguards. The roles that the Commissioner and
the IPT play in overseeing interception of communications contrast rather
sharply with role of judges in the more widely used American system.
However, both the Commissioner and the members of the IPT boast
impressive legal and judicial credentials. Moreover, the statutory role they
play, in conjunction with the Secretary of State’s personal responsibility for
issuing interception warrants, has persuaded the ECtHR that there exist in the
British system “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.” Most
observers agree that permitting government to engage in interception of
communication is a “necessary evil.” That being the case, Britain and the
United States have probably done as sound a job as any modern jurisdiction
of crafting effective arrangements for simultaneously protecting the privacy
rights of individuals at whom such interception is directed.
Postscript
On November 4, 2015, the British Home Secretary, Teresa May,
published the Cameron Government’s “Draft Investigatory Powers Bill.”317
The Government accepted some, but not all, of the recommendations of three
reports published the previous summer.318 In particular, the Government
proposed to establish a “double-lock” system whereby interception warrants
for both law enforcement and national security purposes would continue to
317
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, DRAFT INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL,
2015, Cm. 9152 (U.K.), available at http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-investi
gatory-powers-bill.
318
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be issued by the Secretary of State but could not come into force until
approved by a Judicial Commissioner, who would be a serving or former
High Court judge.319 In addition, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal would
be retained, but there would be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on a
point of law from a determination of the tribunal.320 However, leave to
appeal would need to be granted by the IPT, or, if refused, by the Court of
Appeal.321 In addition, leave to appeal could not be granted by either the IPT
or the Court of Appeal unless it considers that “the appeal would raise an
important point of principle or practice [or] there is another compelling
reason for granting leave.”322
Following publication of the Draft Bill, Parliament appointed an ad hoc
Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, which held hearings
between November 30, 2015, and January 13, 2016.323 On February 11,
2016, the Joint Committee published its report.324 The Committee noted that
“[t]he draft Bill introduces an extra layer of judicial authorisation for powers
that have previously been subject to ministerial authorisation only,” and it
concluded that it was “satisfied that a case has been made for having a
‘double-lock’ authorisation for targeted interception.”325
The Committee raised questions, however, about other aspects of the draft
Bill, including the role assigned to Judicial Commissioners in conducting
general oversight of the warrant-granting system (as distinct from their role
in approving the Secretary of State’s decisions to issue individual
warrants),326 the limited scope of the right to appeal from decisions of the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal,327 and the Government’s decision to
perpetuate a high level of secrecy in connection with deliberations of the
Tribunal.328 The Home Office considered the Committee’s report and other
responses to its draft Bill and submitted revised legislation to Parliament on
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March 1, 2016. By the beginning of October 2016, the Bill—to be known as
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016—had completed most of the stages of
parliamentary scrutiny and was expected to be enacted into law by the end of
the year.329

329
A running account of the progress of Parliament’s deliberations is published at http://
services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/investigatorypowers.html.

